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IF  THE  TEXT  IS  CLEAR—LEXICAL  ORDERING  IN
STATUTORY  INTERPRETATION
Adam M. Samaha*
Most courts now endorse lexical ordering for statutory cases.  That is, a limited set of top-tier
sources, if adequately clear, are supposed to establish statutory meaning.  Lower-tier sources are
held in reserve for close calls.  Examples include legislative history and deference to agency posi-
tions, which often are demoted into tiebreaking roles.  In fact, some such hierarchy of sources is
approved by working majorities at the U.S. Supreme Court and more than forty state supreme
courts.  Although popular today, lexically ordered interpretation has risen and fallen before.
Indeed, we should pause to reconsider whether these instructions are justified and whether judges
can follow them.
This Article explores the core trade-offs and implementation challenges of lexical ordering.
On trade-offs, the Article spotlights decision quality, decision costs, and, less intuitively, decisive-
ness.  Compared to aggregating all source inferences, lexical ordering threatens decision quality
by sometimes throwing out useful information, but it can reduce decision costs and probably will
increase the chance of a decisive judgment.  Compared to flatly excluding lower-tier sources, lexi-
cal ordering probably yields higher quality decisions and decisiveness, but also higher decision
costs.  Whether the overall compromise seems tolerable depends on a series of debatable judgment
calls.  Moreover, the actual trade-offs depend on whether judges lexically order sources in their
decisionmaking, not only in their opinion writing.  To date, we lack evidence either way.
The Article goes on to report results from a new vignette experiment conducted with approxi-
mately one hundred appellate judges.  These judges showed curiously mixed success at lexical
ordering.  In a trade name case, we find little evidence that judges were improperly influenced by
legislative history.  In an election law case, by contrast, we find evidence that judges were improp-
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erly influenced by an agency’s position.  There is much more to learn about the patterns of judi-
cial behavior in this field.  For now, we should expect mixed judicial success at achieving the
mixed advantages and disadvantages of lexical ordering.  The hard trade-offs cannot be casually
assumed or ignored.  With that unsettling lesson, more courts might abandon lexical ordering’s
complex and sometimes fragile architecture—or at least maintain respect for judges who are
committed to less orthodox, more extreme, and simpler methods for deciding statutory cases.
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Where the language is plain . . . the rules which are to aid doubtful
meanings need no discussion.**
And you must strike it from your minds.***
INTRODUCTION
Abandoned at the Supreme Court for decades, lexical ordering returned
to the core conventions of statutory interpretation by the late twentieth cen-
tury.1  That is, today most judges are supposed to decide whether a statute is
clear using a limited set of top-tier sources and, if so, apply this meaning; if
the statute remains unclear, lower-tier sources may or must be considered.
Lower-tier sources are held aside just in case.  Examples familiar to lawyers
involve plain meaning rules that demote without condemning considerations
such as legislative history, deference to administrative agencies, and the rule
of lenity.  Some version of this analytical strut is now planted in the approved
method for deciding statutory cases in nearly every court in the country.  A
popular judicial turn of phrase nowadays is that legislative history “is meant
to clear up ambiguity, not create it,”2 and agency positions usually are
assigned a comparable tiebreaking role.3
Actually, the idea of lexically ordered interpretation is no younger than
Blackstone’s Commentaries.  In 1765, Blackstone listed secondary considera-
tions for statutory cases that were supposed to matter only if “words happen
to be still dubious.”4  His lower-tier sources included statutes on the same
subject, along with the reason and spirit of the statute at issue.5  Lexically
ordered statutory interpretation, which can take many forms, was endorsed at
the Supreme Court by 1920.6  But that approach always had competitors.
Sutherland’s Statutes countered with an apparently wide-open aggregation of
valid sources.  The 1943 edition of the treatise pronounced that “statutory
interpretation . . . is a fact issue.  Where available, the courts should never
exclude relevant evidence on that issue of fact.”7  In this regard the treatise
was less Blackstone and more Holmes,8 as were many judicial opinions in the
** Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917).
*** THE VERDICT (20th Century Fox 1982).
1 Often I will use “interpretation” loosely to include decisionmaking related to law’s
meaning. See infra note 113.
2 Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 574 (2011) (Kagan, J.); see infra subsection
I.B.1.
3 See infra subsection I.B.2.
4 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *60.
5 See id. at *59–61.
6 See, e.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 490 (1917); cf. United States v.
Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805) (Marshall, C.J.) (contrasting, apparently, plain
intent with situations requiring construction).
7 2 J.G. SUTHERLAND & FRANK E. HORACK JR., STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 4502, at 317 (3d ed. 1943).
8 See Bos. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928) (Holmes, J.) (“It
is said that when the meaning of language is plain we are not to resort to evidence in order
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1940s through the 1970s.9  Equally important, simplification through out-
right exclusion of interpretive sources has been recognized as an option for
centuries.10
Blackstone did not evaluate the trade-offs and implementation chal-
lenges for lexical ordering, of course.  Nor have the rest of us done much
better since then, even as the idea returned to prominence by the 1990s.11
Indeed, judges might have become all too familiar with lexical ordering as a
methodological compromise.12  One side’s persistent support for using cer-
tain sources is joined with another side’s persistent objection to those
sources, and a compromise is announced in which the controversial sources
are not repudiated, not embraced, and not reweighted to calibrate their
influence.  Instead, all interpreters are asked to demote the controversial
sources into a lower tier of the decision tree—with the hinge to demoted
sources turning on each interpreter’s sense of clarity, which is supposed to
develop while demoted sources are ignored.
We ought to reconsider, now, whether this complex doctrinal architec-
ture is justified and whether judges can follow it.  Without satisfying either
the judge who prefers to mix together or the judge who prefers to flatly
exclude sources, the lexical ordering of sources lacks a simple and principled
defense under ideal conditions, thus far.13  Adding practical concerns about
to raise doubts.  That is rather an axiom of experience than a rule of law, and does not
preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists.”).
9 See, e.g., Train v. Colo. Pub. Interest Research Grp., Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 10 (1976) (fol-
lowing American Trucking); United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 544 (1940)
(indicating that legislative history may be considered “however clear the words [of a stat-
ute] may appear”); N.Y. State Bankers Ass’n v. Albright, 343 N.E.2d 735, 738 (N.Y. 1975)
(“Then it is often said with more pious solemnity than accuracy, that the clarity of the
statute precludes inquiry into the antecedent legislative history.”); Arthur W. Murphy, Old
Maxims Never Die: The “Plain-Meaning Rule” and Statutory Interpretation in the “Modern” Federal
Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1299, 1300 (1975) (reviewing federal cases and denying a return
to the Caminetti approach); see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., ET AL., STATUTES, REGULATION,
AND INTERPRETATION 434 & n.14 (2014) (suggesting a post–World War II decline of plain
meaning rules in state courts, alongside a rise in use of legislative history, then a rebound
for plain meaning); id. at 350 (suggesting that many courts stuck with plain meaning).
10 See, e.g., Millar v. Taylor (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 217; 4 Burr. 2303, 2332 (Eng.)
(Willes, J.) (regarding textual changes during parliamentary proceedings); Max Radin,
Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 872–73 (1930).
11 See infra Section I.B.
12 See Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological
Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1758 (2010) (describing a
compromise that prioritizes textual analysis over legislative history and that is viable in state
courts).  Gluck’s careful case studies are real contributions; the article did not aspire to
specify all trade-offs or test whether judges lexically order in practice. See id. at 1770.
13 See infra Section II.A (sketching arguments in ideal decision situations).  An earlier
effort to analyze trade-offs appears in Adam M. Samaha, On Law’s Tiebreakers, 77 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1661, 1665–71, 1689–1700, 1708–17 (2010) [hereinafter Samaha, Tiebreakers], which
did not confront implementation challenges.  For a recent contribution with several inci-
sive observations that are broadly consistent with Tiebreakers, see William Baude & Ryan D.
Doerfler, The (Not So) Plain Meaning Rule, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 539 (2017) (discussed in
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decision costs and judicial decisiveness tends to strengthen the argument for
lexical ordering, as we shall see.  But the upsides still might not be worth the
effort after considering the downside risk that useful information will be
ignored.14  The trade-offs should be troubling.
On the other hand, perhaps the instructions do not matter.  Judges and
others have suggested repeatedly that there is nothing clear about clarity tests
for statutes.15  Perhaps judges have convenient understandings of “clarity”
that allow each judge to consider lower-tier sources when they want to and
not when they do not.  Another possibility is that judges are unable to follow
the instructions regardless of their preferences.  “When the reading is done
and the case has been analyzed and argued,” Judge Randolph asked twenty
years ago, “how can it be said that the judge turned to the legislative history
only after finding the statutory language ambiguous?”16  The same question
subsection II.A.1).  For an older critique of plain meaning rules compared to inclusion and
exclusion rules, see Murphy, supra note 9, at 1316.
14 See infra Section II.B.
15 See Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2136,
2138 (2016) (book review) (“The simple and troubling truth is that no definitive guide
exists for determining whether statutory language is clear or ambiguous.”).  For earlier
expressions of the idea, see, for example, Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545
U.S. 546, 572 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[A]mbiguity is apparently in the eye of the
beholder . . . .”); State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 681 N.W.2d 110, 130
(Wis. 2004) (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) (similar); HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M.
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1237 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., Founda-
tion Press 1994) (1958) (asking whether the criteria for plain meaning were sufficiently
definite to block the influence of result-oriented preferences); Frederick J. de Sloove`re,
Textual Interpretation of Statutes, 11 N.Y.U. L. Q. REV. 538, 548 (1934) (asserting that authori-
ties leave no “hint as to what is the test of explicitness”); see also ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A.
GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 436 (2012) (“[D]etermining
what is unambiguous is eminently debatable.”); James J. Brudney, Confirmatory Legislative
History, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 901, 902 (2011) (suggesting that a reader’s self-confidence can
influence clarity perceptions); Thomas W. Merrill, Step Zero After City of Arlington, 83
FORDHAM L. REV. 753, 753 (2014) (asserting that the Chevron doctrine’s clarity and reasona-
bleness elements “are sufficiently flexible to permit virtually any outcome”); George H.
Taylor, Structural Textualism, 75 B.U. L. REV. 321, 356–58, 357 n.163 (1995) (collecting
sources).  A distinct concern is ambiguity over which sources a plain meaning rule is sup-
posed to include. See REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES
229–31 (1975).
16 A. Raymond Randolph, Dictionaries, Plain Meaning, and Context in Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 71, 76 (1994); see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., INTERPRETING
LAW 400 (2016) (maintaining that judges in fact develop plain meaning from an examina-
tion of all relevant legal sources); Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpreta-
tion on the Bench: A Survey of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REV.
1298, 1325 (2018) (“[E]ven judges who may not seek out legislative history are always
exposed to it through briefing materials, so it necessarily helps form an impression . . . .”);
Ethan J. Leib & Michael Serota, Essay, The Costs of Consensus in Statutory Construction, 120
YALE L.J. ONLINE 47, 62 (2010) (“[T]he text in the hard cases will still be viewed by many
judges through the lens of legislative history.”); Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the
Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833,
1882 & n.170 (1998) (quoting Judge Randolph); see also HART & SACKS, supra note 15, at
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should be asked about every lower-tier source.17
Before another twenty years pass, we need to make additional theoretical
and empirical progress on all of the above ideas.  This Article aims to help by
exploring multiple aspects of lexical ordering in statutory cases: its resur-
gence, its unique trade-offs when followed, and its implementation chal-
lenges, alongside new experimental evidence.  These matters are tightly
connected.  Lexical ordering’s spread increases the urgency of revisiting its
core trade-offs, which are shaped by its ground-level implementation.  There
will be much good work left over, in statutory interpretation and in other
fields where lexical ordering might be adopted.18  But the work below con-
tributes on multiple fronts.  More broadly, efforts like this support thoughtful
evaluation of the intertwined architectures of interpretation—doctrinal, cog-
nitive, institutional, physical—by taking theory and implementation seri-
ously, and together.  There can be no simple and definitive take on lexical
ordering for now.  We should recognize this, even advertise it, as motivation
to continue rethinking the foundations of statutory interpretation within
realistic decision environments.
Part I reviews the logic of lexical ordering and shows how far it has
spread into the conventions for deciding statutory cases.  The discussion
focuses on the position of legislative history and agency interpretations.  Join-
ing working majorities at the U.S. Supreme Court, more than forty state
supreme courts now endorse lexical inferiority for state-level legislative his-
tory, and approximately thirty-five do so for state agency interpretations.  But
official positions on interpretive method have not been stable over long peri-
ods in the past, whatever effect they have on behavior.
Part II identifies hard trade-offs, assuming that lexical ordering instruc-
tions are followed and that the clarity test is diagnostic.19  Compared to
aggregating all relevant source inferences, lexically ordering sources threat-
ens decision quality, but it can reduce decision costs and probably will
increase decisiveness.  Compared to flatly excluding lower-tier sources, lexi-
cal ordering probably yields higher quality decisions and increased decisive-
1236 (contending that the plain meaning rule inserted “an artificial and curious dualism
into arguments and opinions”).
17 See KENT GREENAWALT, STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW INTERPRETATION 90 (2013)
(suggesting empirical study to help measure judicial adherence to lexical ordering and the
effect on lawyering); Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 82, 84
(2000) (indicating that lexical ordering is an unavoidable methodological question for
statutory cases that deserves attention in light of high theory and limited evidence); infra
Section III.A (discussing Ward Farnsworth et al., Ambiguity About Ambiguity: An Empirical
Inquiry into Legal Interpretation, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 257 (2010), which involved student
respondents, and other studies involving judges).
18 Possible extensions range widely to include contracts, patents, treaties, and more.
See Samaha, Tiebreakers, supra note 13, at 1681, 1700–37 (addressing securitized debt,
affirmative action, statutory and constitutional interpretation, and legal institutions writ
large).
19 See infra text accompanying notes 123–24 (discussing the probabilistic identification
of useful lower-tier sources, sight unseen).
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ness, but also higher decision costs.  Effects on the probability of a decisive
outcome, in particular, are not widely recognized today.  Adding indecision
risks to decision costs does generate plausible arguments for demoting
sources such as agency interpretations and legislative history.  Perhaps the
overall compromise is tolerable to methodological moderates.  But these
debatable judgment calls should be recognized for what they are.  Moreover,
the actual trade-offs depend on whether judges lexically order sources in
their decisionmaking, not only in their opinion writing.  To date, we lack on-
point evidence either way.
Part III turns to implementation and evidence.  It presents the results of
a new survey and experiment conducted with approximately one hundred
appellate judges.  The survey offers only limited evidence that judges’
propensities to find statutory text clear are aligned with their general views
about the usefulness of legislative history.20  Instead, the survey suggests that
lexical ordering entails sacrifice from many judges.  In the vignette experi-
ment, though, judges showed curiously mixed success at ignoring lower-tier
sources.21  In a trade name case, we find little evidence that judges were
improperly influenced by legislative history.  In an election law case, by con-
trast, we do find evidence that judges were improperly influenced by an
agency’s position.  Even in the election law case, however, we cannot confirm
that judges conveniently bent the clarity test to change the legal relevance of
attractive or unattractive sources.  Other kinds of failure are possible—
including that exposure to a lower-tier source will, distractingly, boost the
judge’s assessment of statutory clarity with or without final judgments
flipping.22
There is more to learn.  But our results do suggest the outlines of action-
able lessons.  Sometimes judges will indeed succeed at lexical ordering (per-
haps when the case is run-of-the-mill and the lower-tier source presents a
complication) in which case the instructions will bite and the hard trade-offs
of quality, cost, and decisiveness should be confronted.  At other times,
judges will fail (perhaps when the case is ideologically charged and the lower-
tier source category is attractive) in which case lexical ordering instructions
are at best wasteful distractions.  As we build theory and evidence to better
identify domains of success and failure, we should generally expect mixed
judicial success at achieving the mixed advantages and disadvantages of lexi-
cally ordered statutory interpretation.  Maybe that much knowledge is
enough to unsettle current trends.  More courts might sensibly abandon lexi-
cal ordering’s complex and sometimes fragile architecture—or at least main-
tain respect for those judges who are committed to less orthodox, more
extreme, and simpler methods.23
20 See infra Section III.B and Figure 1 (showing the dispersion of responses).
21 See infra subsection III.C.3, Figures 2–5, and Tables 3–4.
22 See infra subsection III.D.2.
23 See infra subsection III.D.3.  The challenges for lexical ordering generally do not
depend on which sources are placed in which tiers.  True, each source category—prece-
dent, canons, legislative history, agency positions, and so on—may present special chal-
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I. CONCEPTS AND TRENDS
A. Lexical Ordering
Successful lexical ordering creates a particular kind of priority among
considerations that might be used to make a single decision.  Higher-tier
(lexically superior) considerations must be analyzed on their own and must
trump all lower-tier (lexically inferior) considerations, which are excluded
from the analysis unless the top-tier considerations are deemed inadequate
to deliver a unique result.24  Part of the trick is determining what counts as
an adequate basis for decision using only higher-tier sources.
In any event, lexical ordering is not sequencing.25  Sequencing rules tell
us when, not whether, considerations are supposed to be taken up.  Lexical
ordering’s special contribution to decision theory is the prioritization of one
set of considerations such that others might or might not be ruled out.
Sequencing a list of considerations from first to last might be necessary for
people to make decisions, but lexical ordering certainly is not.  And imposing
a sequencing rule is compatible with guaranteeing that every possible basis
for decision will be considered, but lexical ordering really is not.
This might look a bit complicated, and it is, but the logic of lexical
ordering is no more foreign than the rules for alphabetizing.26  Alphabet-
izing requires us to compare only the first letters in two words and ignore all
other letters unless the first letters are the same; the influence of subsequent
letters is conditioned on earlier appearing letters yielding ties that need
breaking.  Gracefully and powerfully, the algorithm sorts every uniquely
spelled word in the universe into its own, easily located, objectively identified
ordinal position.  So nobody doubts the usefulness of lexical ordering for
organizing bookshelves (where books are still in use).  Whether lexical order-
ing is good for much else, however, ought to be controversial.
Indeed, lexical ordering often is beside the point.  We face long running
and unavoidable debates about the legitimacy and value of various sources in
judicial decisionmaking.  For example, some people contend that legislative
lenges for judicial use.  But this Article concerns the architecture of lexical ordering and is
not a categorical attack on or defense of any particular type of source.
24 See Samaha, Tiebreakers, supra note 13, at 1669 (defining tiebreakers strictly as lexi-
cally inferior decision rules).
25 On sequencing without lexical ordering, see Adam M. Samaha, Starting with the
Text—On Sequencing Effects in Statutory Interpretation and Beyond, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 439,
441–43 (2016) (emphasizing cognitive effects of sequencing, including conditions under
which text-first sequencing might backfire).  Lexical ordering can be accomplished in con-
junction with any sequencing rule, but some sequencing rules will be wasteful and could
make successful lexical ordering more difficult. See id. at 441 n.1.
26 On the early development of alphabetical arrangements, see LLOYD W. DALY, CON-
TRIBUTIONS TO A HISTORY OF ALPHABETIZATIONS IN ANTIQUITY AND THE MIDDLE AGES 15–26
(1967) (reviewing evidence from libraries and cult-membership lists in ancient Greece).
For a famous application to normative judgment, see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
42–43 & n.23 (1971) (depicting the categorical normative superiority of certain considera-
tions in evaluating political systems).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-1\NDL103.txt unknown Seq: 9 19-NOV-18 13:00
2018] lexical  ordering  in  statutory  interpretation 163
history such as committee reports and floor statements should never influ-
ence judges,27 while others maintain that such sources should be taken for
whatever they are worth within a larger mix of considerations.28  Parallel dis-
agreements recur over the appropriate influence of administrative agency
positions.29  Then there are the challenges of weighting and integrating the
implications of whichever sources are deemed valid, in accord with whichever
larger roles judges take on when deciding statutory cases.  These debates are
necessary, even healthy, however dated.
And none of these competing positions suggest lexical ordering.  As a
matter of principle and logic, interpreters can exclude illegitimate, irrele-
vant, or otherwise disfavored sources of information, and they can include
various sources to build an aggregated mix of weighted inferences—all with-
out lexical ordering.  Lexically ordered interpretation neither fully excludes
nor fully includes lower-tier sources.  It swings between exclusion and inclu-
sion depending on a judge’s estimations of clarity.  It therefore presents a
unique blend of trade-offs that depend heavily on which sources are assigned
to which tiers, the content of the clarity test for moving between tiers, and
how judges implement these instructions.
Maybe the effort is worthwhile.  But we can begin by noting that neither
the trade-offs nor the prospects for successful implementation are anything
like alphabetizing books on shelves.
B. Widespread Endorsement
Whatever the complications, we should appreciate the impressive spread
of lexical ordering within officially approved methods for deciding statutory
cases.  By the late stages of the twentieth century, lexically ordered statutory
interpretation was trendy.  The discussion here concentrates on two promi-
nent strains, involving legislative history and agency interpretations, but the
idea is more widespread in statutory cases.30  Worth underscoring is that the
most recent rise of the idea has been promoted by judges, not legislatures.
27 See, e.g., Bank One Chi., N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Tr. Co., 516 U.S. 264, 279–80, 283
(1996) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
28 See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 572 (2005) (Ste-
vens, J., joined by Breyer, J., dissenting).
29 Compare Golden Rule Ins. Co. v. Tomlinson, 335 P.3d 1178, 1188 (Kan. 2014) (“No
deference is paid to an agency’s statutory interpretation.”), with Jack M. Beermann, End the
Failed Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Over-
ruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 779 (2010) (advocating a revival of pre-Chevron multifactor
inquiry), and Kevin M. Stack, Essay, An Administrative Jurisprudence: The Rule of Law in the
Administrative State, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1985, 1998 (2015) (observing that many people
view the statutory clarity question as a matter for de novo court judgment), and Peter L.
Strauss, Essay, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and “Skidmore
Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1164–65 (2012) (arguing that judges should give some
weight to agency judgments about the boundaries of their statutory authority).
30 For the demotion of general statutory purpose and policy-related consequences, see
Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886, 1895–96 (2013), and John F. Manning, The New Purposiv-
ism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 126–29.  For the further demotion of the rule of lenity to a last-
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The state-level construction acts that address lexical ordering are few, and a
few of those statutes have been effectively ignored in court.
1. Legislative History
Congress has not produced an overarching construction act, but federal
judges largely have embraced lexical ordering for federal statutory cases.  An
example involves legislative history such as committee reports and floor state-
ments.  Federal judges often tell us that these sources are ignored unless the
statute’s meaning is otherwise unclear.31  Thus Matal v. Tam32 recently
asserted that “our inquiry into the meaning of the statute’s text ceases when
‘the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent
and consistent.’”33  Yes, the opinion went on to conclude that the party
pointing at the legislative history of the trademark statute had not come up
with anything telling.34  As well, some of the Supreme Court’s modern
remarks—that legislative history “need not” be considered—are less than
definitive.35  But working majorities do appear committed to the lexical
inferiority of legislative history.
The history of this commitment is both long and unstable, however.
Lexical ordering around a plain meaning rule gained judicial support during
the mid-1800s,36 and was featured in Supreme Court opinions by the early
ditch tiebreaker, see, for example, Ocasio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1423, 1434 n.8
(2016).
31 See ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 45 (2014) (indicating that federal court
opinions now commonly declare that clear statutory language marks the end of statutory
interpretation).  There are many current examples of courts taking this approach. See, e.g.,
In re Del Biaggio, 834 F.3d 1003, 1010 (9th Cir. 2016) (O’Scannlain, J.) (“Only when stat-
utes are ambiguous may courts look to legislative history.”); United States v. Rowland, 826
F.3d 100, 108 (2d Cir. 2016) (Carney, J.) (similar); Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., Local 3669 v.
Shinseki, 709 F.3d 29, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Sentelle, J.) (similar).  Consider also the less
sweeping statements in AquAlliance v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 856 F.3d 101, 105
(D.C. Cir. 2017) (Millett, J.), which suggested that it was following the Supreme Court’s
indication that legislative history may not be used to create ambiguity in the Freedom of
Information Act, and Lee v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 802 F.3d 626, 633 (4th Cir. 2015) (Floyd,
J.), which states that consideration of legislative history is unnecessary if statutory text is
unambiguous.
32 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
33 Id. at 1756 (quoting Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002)).
34 Id.  Proceeding to consider legislative history, even after asserting statutory clarity, is
not unusual. See, e.g., AquAlliance, 856 F.3d at 105; Del Biaggio, 834 F.3d at 1010–11; Row-
land, 826 F.3d at 109; Lee, 802 F.3d at 633.
35 E.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2412 (2018); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v.
United States ex rel. Rigsby, 137 S. Ct. 436, 444 (2016); United States v. Woods, 134 S. Ct.
557, 567 n.5 (2013) (similar); see also Murphy, supra note 9, at 1303–04 (suggesting that
such “need not” language does not support a plain meaning rule).
36 See William S. Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation: A Study in Form and Sub-
stance, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 799, 812–13, 813 nn.73–74 (1985) (reviewing treatises and state
and federal judicial opinions).
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1900s. Caminetti v. United States,37 a textbook example, declared it “elemen-
tary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the
language in which the act is framed.”38  This statement looks like a sequenc-
ing rule, but the Court followed up with an endorsement of lexical priority:
“[I]f that [meaning] is plain, . . . the sole function of the courts is to enforce
it according to its terms,” and “the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings
need no discussion.”39 Caminetti may be contrasted with the Holy Trinity
approach of the late 1800s,40 because the latter emphasized the law’s spirit
over its text while the former did the opposite.41  But on the propriety of
lexical ordering, Caminetti and Holy Trinity are in lockstep.  Their approaches
differ over which sources should be placed in which tiers, not whether tiers
should be constructed in the first place.
Lexical ordering was apparently replaced by an ultrainclusive “no rule of
law” approach in United States v. American Trucking Associations in 1940.42
Emphasizing legislative purpose and relying on legislative history, the Court’s
opinion announced that “[w]hen aid to construction of the meaning of
words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no ‘rule of
law’ which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on ‘superficial
examination.’”43  This add-it-all-up notion was reaffirmed by a unanimous
Supreme Court as late as 1976, when a lower court was rebuked for saying
exactly what the high Court would later endorse once again: that judges
37 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
38 Id. at 485.
39 Id.
40 See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) (“[A]
thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not
within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.”).
41 See JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 49
(3d ed. 2017) (presenting Holy Trinity–style purposivism as competing with a Caminetti-style
plain meaning rule); cf. Adrian Vermeule, The Cycles of Statutory Interpretation, 68 U. CHI. L.
REV. 149, 183 (2001) (describing Holy Trinity, Caminetti, and American Trucking as part of a
cycle between relatively literalist and purposivist approaches, the latter allowing many
sources extrinsic to statutory text).
42 United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 544 (1940) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
43 Id. at 543–44 (quoting Helvering v. N.Y. Tr. Co. 292 U.S. 455, 465 (1934)); see id. at
547–48 (proceeding to rely on legislative history and other sources); HART & SACKS, supra
note 15, at 1237 (asserting “the overthrow of the plain meaning rule in the federal
courts”). But cf. Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 61 (1949) (“[T]here is no need to refer to the
legislative history where the statutory language is clear.”).  For a detailed argument that the
capacity and lawyering of federal agencies help explain the Court’s rising reliance on legis-
lative history, see Nicholas R. Parrillo, Leviathan and Interpretive Revolution: The Administra-
tive State, the Judiciary, and the Rise of Legislative History, 1890–1950, 123 YALE L.J. 266, 315
(2013).
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“need not resort to legislative history” when a statute is “plain and
unambiguous.”44
By the early 1990s, lexical inferiority for legislative history reappeared in
Supreme Court opinions, as others have recounted.45  This development
should be understood alongside concentrated attacks on the intelligibility,
reliability, and legitimacy of legislative history as a reflection of collective con-
gressional intent.  Those attacks influenced judicial thinking, but not enough
to achieve a flat exclusion.  The demotion of legislative history into a lexically
inferior tier is now endorsed by many federal judges who are not self-
described textualists.  “[W]e do not resort to legislative history to cloud a
statutory text that is clear,” Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court in 1994.46
When Congress bothers to produce legislative history,47 the Supreme Court
tends to demote it without necessarily excluding it.
State courts are where most judicial interpretation takes place in this
country.48  While their approved methods vary, more than forty state
supreme courts more or less plainly announce that they push legislative his-
tory into a lower tier.49  Thus Michigan’s Supreme Court has announced
that, when statutory text is “unambiguous . . . the examination of legislative
history ‘of any form’ is not proper.”50  Sometimes a state court’s position is
not so categorical, as when California’s high court recently called a statute
44 Colo. Pub. Interest Research Grp., Inc. v. Train, 507 F.2d 743, 748 (10th Cir. 1974),
rev’d, 426 U.S. 1, 10–24 (1976) (quoting American Trucking and relying heavily on a com-
mittee report and floor debates).
45 See, e.g., Manning, supra note 30, at 126; Vermeule, supra note 41, at 183; see also W.
Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98–99 (1991).  Compare less categorical state-
ments in the 1980s and late 1970s. See, e.g., United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S.
235, 242 (1989) (indicating that a statute’s plain meaning should be conclusive “except” if
the result would be “demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters” (quoting
Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc. 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982))); Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill,
437 U.S. 153, 184 n.29 (1978) (stating that “we ordinarily” ignore legislative history when a
statute is facially unambiguous).
46 Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147–48 (1994).
47 See BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING 18, 51 (5th ed. 2017) (reporting
that major measures bypassed committees in the House about one-third of the time from
2007 to 2014, and in the Senate more than half the time from 2009 to 2014).
48 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 16, at 199–200, 244–45 (reviewing availability of and reli-
ance on state-level legislative history).
49 Thirty-seven state supreme courts plainly adopt this position, in my view; approxi-
mately eight other supreme courts are somewhat harder to code but apparently support
such lexical ordering.  These observations are based on a nationwide review of state con-
struction acts and state supreme court opinions from 2013 to 2017, plus several earlier
opinions where necessary or helpful to characterize a state’s most recent position, and
from 1973 to 1977.  A database of authorities with Westlaw search strings is on file with the
author.
50 Aroma Wines & Equip., Inc. v. Columbian Distrib. Servs., Inc., 871 N.W.2d 136, 146
n.49 (Mich. 2015) (quoting In re Certified Questions from the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit, 659 N.W.2d 597, 601 n.5 (Mich. 2003)) (discussing legislative staff analy-
sis); cf. ESKRIDGE, supra note 16, at 202 (observing a march “toward the exclusionary
approach since 1999” in Michigan).
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clear and said “we need go no further,” then proceeded to check on relevant
legislative history.51  Nonetheless, most state courts now align with the
Supreme Court on this issue.  In the mid-1970s, when the American Trucking
approach was reaffirmed for federal courts, explicit state court commitments
to the lexical inferiority of legislative history did appear but were less domi-
nant.  In those years, many state supreme courts were not articulating a posi-
tion on the matter.52
Today, only a few state courts are bold enough to explicitly reject lexical
inferiority for legislative history.  New York remains outside the trend, for
instance, although the state’s position has not been fixed for long periods.
Recently the high court affirmed that, “[a]lthough the plain language of the
statute provides the best evidence of legislative intent, ‘the legislative history
of an enactment may also be relevant and is not to be ignored, even if words
be clear.’”53  Alaska’s judiciary is a resolute outlier on this matter, having
articulated a “sliding scale approach” to plain meaning in conjunction with
other sources,54 while New Mexico’s high court has acknowledged extraordi-
nary situations in which plain meaning “must yield” to indications from legis-
lative history.55  But in the past few years, only a couple of other state
supreme courts have expressed even limited support for legislative history
entering the top tier.56
At the opposite end of the spectrum, the number of state judiciaries that
flatly exclude legislative history appears to be zero.  On occasion, however,
the stakes are low.  “Legislative history” can be a very limited set of material at
51 Scher v. Burke, 395 P.3d 680, 688 (Cal. 2017) (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. Franchise
Tax Bd., 139 P.3d 1169, 1173 (Cal. 2006)) (proceeding to rely on a legislative counsel’s
digest, the enrolled bill memorandum to the governor, and committee analysis).
52 Authorities are gathered in the file referenced in note 49.
53 Kimmel v. State, 80 N.E.3d 370, 377 (N.Y. 2017) (quoting Tompkins Cty. Support
Collection Unit v. Chamberlin, 786 N.E.2d 14 (N.Y. 2003)).  Compare the less committed
position in Avella v. City of New York, 80 N.E.3d 982, 989 (N.Y. 2017), in which the court
indicated that the court “need not” consider legislative history because of the statute’s
plain language, but proceeded to consider it anyway, and contrast the earlier declaration
in Wash. Post Co. v. N.Y. State Ins. Dep’t, 463 N.E.2d 604, 606 (N.Y. 1984), in which the
court said: “When the plain language of the statute is precise and unambiguous, it is deter-
minative.” Id.
54 Muller v. BP Expl. (Alaska), Inc., 923 P.2d 783, 788–89 (Alaska 1996); see Alaska
Miners Ass’n v. Holman, 397 P.3d 312, 315 (Alaska 2017) (indicating that the court consid-
ers legislative history alongside statutory text).
55 Fowler v. Vista Care, 329 P.3d 630, 633–34 (N.M. 2014) (quoting Sims v. Sims, 930
P.2d 153, 157 (N.M. 1996)) (referencing legislative history, equity, and other sources).
56 Oregon might have turned against lexical ordering, too. See infra note 69.  For ten-
sion in recent pronouncements within the same state, compare, for example, AIDS Sup-
port Grp. of Cape Cod, Inc. v. Town of Barnstable, 76 N.E.3d 969, 974–75 (Mass. 2017)
(quoting Hoffman v. Howmedica, Inc., 364 N.E.2d 1215, 1218 (Mass. 1977)), which stated
that legislative history is “not ordinarily” a proper source of construction if statutory lan-
guage is unambiguous, and consulted such sources, with People for the Ethical Treatment
of Animals, Inc. v. Dep’t of Agric. Res., 76 N.E.3d 227, 234–35 (Mass. 2017), which stated
that clear statutory language is conclusive.
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the state level, perhaps referring to earlier enacted versions of the state code
and nothing else.  A few states do not maintain official legislative history in
the sense of witness testimony, legislator debates, committee reports, or staff
summaries.57  Yet lexical ordering is the prevailing approach in most states
nonetheless.  That is, a few states demote earlier enacted versions of statutes
into a lower tier, having no other official legislative history to demote.58
Regardless, judges rather than legislatures lead the way.  Few state codes
of construction address whether legislative history should be lexically inferior
to other sources.59  The state construction acts that do speak to the role of
legislative history are a bit mixed.  The Texas code provision, adopted in
1985, looks like support for legislative history staying in the top tier: “In con-
struing a statute, whether or not the statute is considered ambiguous on its
face, a court may consider among other matters the . . . legislative history.”60
The Oregon code, as amended in 2001, backs the ability of parties to offer
legislative history but defers to judges on how much weight to give it.61  In
contrast, the Pennsylvania code, adopted in 1972, obviously embraces lexical
ordering.  The code announces that when a statute’s words are “clear and
free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the
57 See, e.g., State v. $223,405.86, 203 So.3d 816, 832 n.8 (Ala. 2016) (“Alabama does not
create or maintain typical legislative-history material such as committee reports and
records of hearings.”); Caves v. Yarbrough, 991 So.2d 142, 153 n.17 (Miss. 2008) (similar);
Heath v. Guardian Interlock Network, Inc., 369 P.3d 374, 378 (Okla. 2016) (similar); State
ex rel. Biafore v. Tomblin, 782 S.E.2d 223, 234 (W. Va. 2016) (Loughry, J., concurring)
(similar).
58 See, e.g., Ex parte B.C., 178 So.3d 853, 855–56 (Ala. 2015) (demoting “the law as it
existed prior to such statute’s enactment” (quoting Reeder v. State ex rel. Myers, 314 So.2d
853, 857 (1975))). But cf. Ray v. Swager, 903 N.W.2d 366, 380–82 & nn.68 & 74 (Mich.
2017) (distinguishing legislative history from statutory history and allowing statutory
amendment history into the top tier); Columbia Riverkeeper v. Port of Vancouver USA,
395 P.3d 1031, 1038 (Wash. 2017) (including statutory amendments in the top tier).
59 On eleven state construction acts that do address legislative history, see Jacob Scott,
Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341, 380–82 (2010).  Leg-
islative silence on this point is not entirely for lack of trying.  The American Bar Associa-
tion’s National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws recommended in
1993 that legislative history be demoted to a lower tier of sources. See UNIF. STATUTE &
RULE CONSTR. ACT §§ 18–20, 14 U.L.A. 71–74 (1994); id. § 20 cmt. at 75 (confirming that
the recommended “step by step” approach would reserve legislative history for cases where
statutory meaning is otherwise “uncertain”).  Like the Conference’s 1965 effort at a uni-
form statutory construction act, which was not as clearly committed to lexical ordering, see
UNIF. STATUTORY CONSTR. ACT §§ 13, 15 (withdrawn 1995), 14 U.L.A. 522–28 (1968) (offer-
ing a nonexhaustive list of sources that may be considered when a statute is ambiguous
without expressly endorsing a plain meaning rule), few state legislatures followed the 1993
proposal.
60 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.023 (West 2017).
61 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 174.020(3) (West 2018) (“A court shall give the weight to the
legislative history that the court considers to be appropriate.”).  Note the labor-saving
device offered to judges, who were granted permission to limit review to sources “that the
parties provide to the court.” Id.
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pretext of pursuing its spirit,”62 and then approves consideration of legisla-
tive history and other listed sources “[w]hen the words of the statute are not
explicit.”63  Several other state codes are equally or nearly as explicit about
demoting legislative history.64
How much these statutes matter is open to question.  Construction acts
have not always influenced even official judicial policy,65 and their effects on
case results are unknown.  Despite the openness to legislative history in the
text of the Texas code, the Texas Supreme Court has declared that “legisla-
tive history cannot override a statute’s plain words.”66  Last year, that court
suggested that the matter is beyond the legislature’s authority.67  Nearly ten
years ago, the Oregon Supreme Court saw its legislature’s invitation to assign
weight to legislative history and responded with a rule: “[N]o weight can be
given to legislative history” when statutory text can have only one meaning.68
That court might now be tacking back, away from lexical ordering.69  Indeed,
headstrong judicial leadership can run either way.  New Mexico’s code
appears to reserve “the purpose of a statute . . . as determined from the legis-
lative . . . history of the statute” for cases of residual uncertainty.70  Yet New
Mexico’s Supreme Court has affirmed that “[t]he plain meaning rule ‘must
62 1 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921(b) (West 2018).
63 Id. § 1921(c)(7).
64 See LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 1:4, 24:177 (2018) (regarding letter and spirit, and legislative
history for ambiguity); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 645.16(7) (West 2018) (same); N.D. CENT.
CODE ANN. §§ 1-02-05, 1-02-39.3 (West 2018) (same); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-2z
(West 2018) (referring to meaning that is “plain and unambiguous and does not yield
absurd or unworkable results”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-2A-20.C(2) (West 2018) (reserving
“the purpose of a statute . . . as determined from the legislative or administrative history of
the statute” for cases of residual uncertainty).  The Colorado, Iowa, and Ohio construction
acts have the second clause on legislative history without the first clause on letter and spirit.
See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2-4-203(1)(c) (West 2018); IOWA CODE ANN. § 4.6.3 (West
2018); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1.49(C) (West 2018).
65 See Gluck, supra note 12, at 1771–91 (examining state court opinions in five jurisdic-
tions including Oregon and Texas, and showing apparent departures from statutory
instructions for interpretation); Amy Widman, Interpretive Independence: The Irrelevance of
Judicial Selection and Retention Methods to State Statutory Interpretation, 70 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 377, 393–94, 401, 404–08 (2015) (counting such departures in a sizable minority of
supreme court opinions in eleven states).
66 In re Collins, 286 S.W.3d 911, 918 (Tex. 2009).
67 See BankDirect Capital Fin., LLC v. Plasma Fab, LLC, 519 S.W.3d 76, 85 (Tex. 2017)
(“Interpretive prescriptions, or permissions, to put a finger on the scale and stretch text
beyond its permissible meaning invade the courts’ singular duty to interpret the laws.”); see
also Billeaudeau v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp. Auth., 218 So. 3d 513, 516 n.4 (La. 2016) (similar
for a construction act regarding demotion of legislative history).
68 State v. Gaines, 206 P.3d 1042, 1051 (Or. 2009).
69 See Spearman v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co., 396 P.3d 885, 888 (Or. 2017) (indicat-
ing that the court must “determine the meaning of the words of the statute most likely
intended by the legislature that enacted it, taking into account its text in context and the
relevant legislative history,” yet citing Gaines); Lake Oswego Pres. Soc’y v. City of Lake
Oswego, 379 P.3d 462, 468 (Or. 2016) (similar).
70 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-2A-20.C(2) (West 2018).
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yield on occasion to an intention otherwise discerned in terms of equity, leg-
islative history, or other sources.’”71
2. Agency Interpretations
A similar trend applies to agency positions.  For federal courts dealing
with federal agencies, part of the Chevron doctrine calls for lexical ordering
with a clarity hinge.  Federal courts are not supposed to defer to agency inter-
pretations when the meaning of a federal statute is adequately clear on the
issue at hand (“Step One”).72  Almost surely the doctrine means to stop the
agency’s position from influencing the judiciary’s evaluation of statutory clar-
ity; otherwise deference would creep into the decision of whether to defer.73
There are other parts to the doctrine—only some agency interpretations are
eligible for deference (“Step Zero”),74 and apparently courts are supposed to
apply some kind of reasonableness test when the statute is unclear (“Step
Two”).75  Nonetheless, Step One imposes a clarity test that is analytically simi-
lar to the hinge for considering legislative history discussed above.
Chevron was decided in 1984, during the transition away from American
Trucking’s inclusiveness. American Trucking itself cited not only legislative his-
tory but also an agency’s position as factors in its decision.76  Thus Chevron
can be understood as displacing a multifactor test that was supposed to cali-
brate the degree of deference to the persuasiveness of the agency position,
and then add other interpretive sources to the mix.77 Chevron was unani-
mous among the seven Justices participating, and we might wonder whether
part of the doctrine’s attractiveness was the joinder of plain meaning with a
second-tier consideration.  Each type of source retained potential influence
on outcomes, even though the analysis seemed to be structured differently.
Either way, Chevron was a forerunner to a broader set of lexical ordering
moves at the Court.
State-level endorsement of Chevron-style lexical ordering is common, but
outliers do exist.  In approximately five western states, judges are supposed to
give no deference or weight to a home state agency’s interpretation of a
71 Fowler v. Vista Care, 329 P.3d 630, 633–34 (N.M. 2014) (quoting Sims v. Sims, 930
P.2d 153, 157 (N.M. 1996)).
72 See, e.g., Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1979 (2016);
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
73 See Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Vilsack, 736 F.3d 284, 289 (4th Cir. 2013) (stating that,
at Chevron Step One, “the court gives no weight to the agency’s interpretation”).  A differ-
ent view is argued in Strauss, supra note 29, at 1164–65.
74 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227–31 (2001); Thomas W. Merrill &
Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 873 (2001).
75 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–45, 851, 865–66; cf. Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian
Vermeule, Essay, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597, 599–603 (2009) (contend-
ing that Step Two can be folded into Step One or otherwise made redundant with arbitrari-
ness review).
76 See United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 545 (1940).
77 See Manning, supra note 30, at 162–63; Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Execu-
tive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 972–73 (1992).
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home state statute.78  Additionally, Iowa courts demand that a state statute
clearly delegate discretion to the state agency on the disputed issue before
entertaining deference to the agency’s interpretation.79  On the other hand,
a few state courts indicate that an agency interpretation is one factor in the
overall mix of considerations, or that the agency’s position is considered in
determining the plainness of statutory meaning.80
Nonetheless, most state doctrine accords with Chevron on the priority of
clear statutory meaning.  In recent years, approximately thirty-five state
supreme courts have more or less plainly announced that they support an
analytical step in which judges independently determine whether a statute is
sufficiently clear to foreclose deference or weight to an agency interpreta-
tion.81  In Massachusetts, for example, courts tell us that they review an
agency’s statutory interpretation de novo—but they also depict an analytical
structure that largely tracks Chevron, asking first “whether the Legislature has
78 See Golden Rule Ins. Co. v. Tomlinson, 335 P.3d 1178, 1188 (Kan. 2014) (“No defer-
ence is paid to an agency’s statutory interpretation.”); Mont. Dep’t of Revenue v. Priceline
.com, Inc., 354 P.3d 631, 636 (Mont. 2015) (reviewing for correctness); Aline Bae Tanning,
Inc. v. Neb. Dep’t of Revenue, 880 N.W.2d 61, 65 (Neb. 2016) (asserting independent
review); Midwest Railcar Repair, Inc. v. S.D. Dep’t of Revenue, 872 N.W.2d 79, 85 (S.D.
2015) (rejecting deference for conclusions of law); Seherr-Thoss v. Teton Cty. Bd. of Cty.
Comm’rs, 329 P.3d 936, 943 & n.2 (Wyo. 2014) (similar, though leaving room for defer-
ence to longstanding agency interpretations).  There have been equivocations. See Sierra
Club v. Mosier, 391 P.3d 667, 684–85 (Kan. 2017) (attempting to distinguish situations
where the statute grants the agency a zone of discretion); Bostwick Props., Inc. v. Mont.
Dep’t of Nat. Res. & Conservation, 296 P.3d 1154, 1159 (Mont. 2013) (listing agency con-
struction as one of four “factors” in statutory interpretation for cases involving the Depart-
ment of Natural Resources); Project Extra Mile v. Neb. Liquor Control Comm’n, 810
N.W.2d 149, 162–63 (Neb. 2012) (acknowledging occasional court statements supporting
agency weight, especially after the legislature fails to amend); Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Qwest
Corp., 299 P.3d 1176, 1182 (Wyo. 2013) (articulating a Chevron-like formulation).
79 See Myria Holdings Inc. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 892 N.W.2d 343, 347 (Iowa 2017);
cf. IOWA CODE ANN. § 17A.19.11.b–c (West 2018) (addressing the test for agency deference,
without the word “clearly”).
80 See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-2A-20.B(4) (West 2018) (listing administrative con-
struction in the top tier); Marbob Energy Corp. v. N.M. Oil Conservation Comm’n, 206
P.3d 135, 139 (N.M. 2009) (stating that the court is merely “less likely to defer” when the
statute is clear).
81 Authorities are on file with the author.  Twenty-seven state supreme courts, in my
view, plainly support this approach.  In eight other states, the supreme court’s current
position is not as easy to code but there are noteworthy indications of support for such
ordering. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Krafft, 158 A.3d 539, 547 (Md. 2017) (stating
that courts “may accord some weight” to an agency’s statutory interpretation without
adverting to statutory clarity); Md. Ins. Comm’r v. Cent. Acceptance Corp., 33 A.3d 949,
958 (Md. 2011) (stating, six years earlier, that “when the language of the statute is clear
and unambiguous, no deference is due”).  Other helpful reviews of state court positions on
agency deference include ESKRIDGE, supra note 16, at 283–88, and Bernard W. Bell, The
Model APA and the Scope of Judicial Review: Importing Chevron into State Administrative Law, 20
WIDENER L.J. 801, 818–19 (2011).
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spoken with certainty on the topic in question.”82  Like their treatment of
legislative history, state supreme courts in the mid-1970s were less likely to
explicitly demote agency interpretations.  During those years, the range of
state court positions was more balanced.83
* * *
Just because a court endorses lexical ordering hardly ensures that judges
will do it.  Some federal judges might think that certain elements of interpre-
tive method are matters of personal choice,84 and, even when they try, judges
might not always follow instructions.  Even high court opinions may backslide
on the orthodox approach. King v. Burwell85 references congressional com-
mittee work—albeit quickly and bashfully—to develop a background under-
standing of what the Affordable Care Act was trying to achieve and how.86
Careful examination of the Act’s text appears later on.87  Regardless, neither
officially prescribed nor actually practiced interpretive method is fully stable
over time.  Official support for lexically ordered statutory interpretation has
risen and fallen before.88
Furthermore, even if implemented flawlessly, lexical ordering leaves
open many choices.  Judges still must decide which sources belong in which
tiers, how to weight and interact sources within the same tier, and the con-
tent of the doctrinal hinge between tiers.  The proper weighting and interac-
tion of interpretive sources are old challenges that do not go away when
lexical ordering is adopted.  The assignment of sources to tiers and the con-
struction of a hinge based on “clarity” are additional tasks that are unneeded
for outright exclusion or inclusion of sources.89
82 Biogen IDEC MA, Inc. v. Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 908 N.E.2d 740, 750 (Mass.
2009) (quoting Goldberg v. Bd. of Health of Grandby, 830 N.E.2d 207, 213 (Mass. 2005))
(citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)); see also Peter-
borough Oil Co. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 50 N.E.3d 827, 832 (Mass. 2016) (similar).
83 Using the same search queries for 1973–77, eleven state supreme courts more or
less plainly endorsed lexical inferiority for agency interpretations, nineteen courts more or
less plainly rejected it in favor of mixing considerations or de novo review, and seventeen
courts did not offer an opinion on the issue.  Authorities are on file with the author.
84 Cf. Evan J. Criddle & Glen Staszewski, Essay, Against Methodological Stare Decisis, 102
GEO. L.J. 1573, 1576–77 (2014) (asserting that federal courts tend not to give stare decisis
effect to interpretive methodology for statutes); Gluck & Posner, supra note 16, at 1316,
1345–46 (indicating that the interviewed circuit judges accepted Chevron doctrine as bind-
ing, and that many interviewees considered legislative history if statutory text is unclear,
but that several interviewees also doubted that the Supreme Court may impose broad inter-
pretive rules beyond certain canons).
85 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
86 See id. at 2486 (citing a Senate committee hearing in an introductory discussion).
87 See id. at 2489–90 (concluding that the Act was unclear on the issue of subsidy avail-
ability).  The sequence of analysis in a written opinion is not necessarily the sequence for
the decision process, of course.
88 See supra text accompanying notes 37–44.
89 For complaints that the clarity test lacks guiding content, see supra notes 15–17.
Courts have disputed over which sources belong in which tiers. See, e.g., Yates v. United
States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1081–83 (2015) (plurality opinion) (relying on a statutory title); id.
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Indeed we should entertain the possibility that lexical ordering is a low-
stakes choice.  Its logical structure might be sufficiently unstable, ignored,
narrow, manipulable, or flexible across judges with different interpretive
inclinations to make little difference in adjudication.  But these are possibili-
ties rather than established facts.  Consider that judges act as if lexical order-
ing is a distinctive and meaningful option—endorsing it in many, but not all,
jurisdictions and for many, but not all, fields of legal interpretation.  So pru-
dence also recommends that we take seriously the widespread official posi-
tion on lexical ordering for statutory cases, and think hard about whether
some form of it can be justified and implemented.
II. TRADE-OFFS IN THEORY
Trends in statutory interpretation are subject to change, as earlier pro-
ponents of lexical ordering found out.  If and when a different trend
emerges, judges probably will act as central players in reform efforts, as they
have in the past.  In any event, a trend is not a justification.  And today we
should wonder whether lexical ordering’s justifications match its current
popularity.  This Part identifies core advantages and disadvantages as a mat-
ter of general theory.  The discussion begins with a kind of ideal decision
situation that assumes away decision costs, indecision risks, and any need for
judges to compromise, then foregrounds such considerations to give lexical
ordering a better defense.  The goal here is to advertise major trade-offs with-
out forcing definitive conclusions.  With little existing work on the deep ques-
tions for lexical ordering in statutory cases, we have to take initial steps that
leave some matters unresolved.90
That said, much of the analysis generalizes across sources and goals for
statutory interpretation.  In fact, similar trade-offs apply whenever judges try
to categorically prioritize bundles of considerations that are part of the same
decision.91  So, too, for structures well beyond adjudication, such as the
at 1094 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (asserting that statutory titles cannot limit plain meaning in
operative provisions); Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Vilsack, 736 F.3d 284, 289 (4th Cir. 2013)
(indicating that legislative history should be considered at Chevron Step One); United
States v. Geiser, 527 F.3d 288, 294 (3d Cir. 2008) (indicating that legislative history should
be considered at Step Two).  Arguably, judicial precedent sits in the highest tier of sources.
See Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015) (reiterating that stare
decisis is supposed to have “enhanced force” for cases interpreting statutes).
90 The analysis below concentrates on source categories (e.g., legislative history, agency
interpretations), rather than particular items that are examples of such sources (e.g., the
committee report in Train, the agency position in Chevron).  Today’s judicial instructions
for lexically ordered statutory interpretation rest on such broad categories. See supra Sec-
tion I.B.  Also note that lexical ordering sometimes has more than two tiers.  The analysis
below concentrates on a two-tier structure, which is the least complicated version and a
sensible starting point.
91 See Samaha, Tiebreakers, supra note 13, at 1673 (investigating “lexically ordered rules
that address the same decision,” while pointing out that “there is no orthodox way to iden-
tify the relevant ‘decision’”).  For a challenge, think about whether subject-matter jurisdic-
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proper relationships among law, ethics, and private ordering,92 and the eval-
uation of political systems.93  In any of these fields we are free to ask about
the justifications for demoting considerations, the effect on decision quality,
the likelihood that decisionmakers will ignore lower-tier sources, and so on.
Of course, each application takes place in its own decision environment.  We
take up statutory interpretation here.  If this analysis is cast too narrowly,
there will be opportunities for expansion later on.
A. Ideal Decision Situations
Suppose, unrealistically, that interpretation is costless and that interpret-
ers face no problem resolving cases decisively or agreeing on a general
method of decision.  In such ideal decision situations, lexical ordering
becomes not only odd but troubling.
1. Against Lexical Ordering
The core risk is valuable information loss.  If a lower-tier source is rele-
vant to the decision, lexical ordering entails that decisionmakers lose
whatever value it has for the fraction of decisions in which top-tier sources
are deemed sufficient.  To illustrate and simplify, if judges conclude that top-
tier sources are sufficiently clear about 50% of the time, but find lower-tier
sources useful about 50% of the time, then about 25% of all decisions will
suffer the exclusion of useful information.94  In this quarter of the docket,
lower-tier sources have no power to make the call closer or easier than it first
seemed, or to influence the formulation of governing doctrine, or to flip the
final judgment.  We may characterize any of these effects as losses in decision
quality, especially the latter two.  And the threat holds regardless of one’s
values or goals for statutory interpretation.
It is true that lower-tier information presumably is less valuable than top-
tier information.95  Perhaps decisionmakers can select lower-tier source cate-
tion and the so-called merits of a case should count as one lexically ordered decision about
case outcome, or two different decisions that merely share the same decision tree.
92 See id. at 1717–37 (considering law as life’s tiebreaker, and vice versa).
93 See RAWLS, supra note 26, at 42–43.  Under the Rawls framework, people deserve a
base level of various goods before anyone is made substantially better off than others. See
id. at 43, 541–42 (referring to a certain base level of wealth alongside basic liberties).
These priorities were grounded on what Rawls thought would be accepted in his hypotheti-
cal original position decision situation and upon our considered judgment, but the lexical
ordering in Rawls’s theory was not extensively defended. See id. at 542–48.  It might be
imprudent to implicate his work on this score, especially as an aside.  But we should be
sensitive to what lexical ordering demands and be careful to put that logical structure in its
proper place.
94 0.5 * 0.5 = 0.25, assuming that the probability of lower-tier sources being useful is
independent of the top-tier sources seeming adequate.  These numbers are loosely based
on results from the survey described in Section III.B.
95 See Samaha, Tiebreakers, supra note 13, at 1699–700 (suggesting that the most valua-
ble sources be placed in the top tier, all else equal); cf. Louis Kaplow, Optimal Multistage
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gories such that the probability of their usefulness is higher than zero yet far
lower than 50%.  (If a source category has zero chance of being useful, the
category should be flatly excluded, not lexically ordered.)  As well, lowering
the probability of stopping with the top-tier sources, such as by loosening up
what counts as “unclear,” will decrease the risk of information loss.  Deci-
sionmakers also may load up the top tier with as many potentially useful
sources as possible.  But any of the foregoing options will merely lower the
probability that lower-tier source information will be useful or will be ignored
when it is.  Just yet, we have no reason to tolerate any such risk.  When a
lower-tier source turns out to make no difference, no harm is done by consid-
ering it—not on our initial assumption of costless decisionmaking.  The qual-
ity losses from lexical ordering are deadweight.
These simple thoughts are consistent with more sophisticated normative
decision theory.  One straightforward position on information in ideal deci-
sion situations is that “more information is better.”96  Assuming relevance
and barring cognitive difficulties, increasing the amount of information con-
sidered should increase the chance of an accurate, reliable, and otherwise
high-quality decision.  More formally, the principle of total evidence for
rational actors recommends the use of all available evidence when estimating
the likelihood of various outcomes—again, bracketing the costs of collecting
and using the information.97  One can make the same claim about any
source that is relevant to understanding and applying statutes in
adjudication.
Inclusive theoretical approaches to information leave no apparent room
for lexical ordering, but they do allow us to assign different weights and con-
fidence levels for different considerations.  By way of analogy, rational choice
and expected utility maximization theorists long ago developed weighted-
additive models for integrating a large number of decision factors.98  Weights
can follow the estimated reliability of broad source categories or narrower
subsets thereof.  Ordinary meaning of statutory text could be assigned very
heavy influence, statutory titles could get little but not zero weight, while
Adjudication, 33 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 613, 644–45 (2017) (suggesting that adjudication stages
might be sequenced such that information with “a high ratio of diagnosticity to cost” is
gathered first).
96 See J. Edward Russo, More Information Is Better: A Reevaluation of Jacoby, Speller and
Kohn, 1 J. CONSUMER RES. 68, 71 (1974) (questioning an earlier study of information
overload).
97 See I.J. Good, On the Principle of Total Evidence, 17 BRIT. J. FOR PHIL. SCI. 319, 319
(1967).
98 See, e.g., RALPH L. KEENEY & HOWARD RAIFFA, DECISIONS WITH MULTIPLE OBJECTIVES
137–38 (1993); JOHN W. PAYNE ET AL., THE ADAPTIVE DECISION MAKER 24 (1993).  A similar
analogy can be made to Bayesian updating.  Beliefs about the probability of a proposition
being true can be adjusted based on a stream of new information, with different items
having different effects. See generally Michael O. Finkelstein & William B. Fairley, A Baye-
sian Approach to Identification Evidence, 83 HARV. L. REV. 489, 497–500 (1970) (“We tend to
see a case as a whole . . . .”).
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committee reports and agency positions could fall somewhere in between.99
On similar logic, we have to distinguish lexical ordering from mere presump-
tions.  Presumptions remain within the overall mix of considerations,
whatever their weight.100  A lexical ordering of considerations cannot give
that assurance of inclusive evaluation.
At the same time, thoughtful decisionmakers might flatly exclude troub-
lesome considerations.  In life and law, people try to avoid relying at all on
disfavored bases for particular decisions, even when the information is cheap
to process.  For instance, many people want to ensure that in most circum-
stances job applicants are not hired because of their race, religion, or sex.  A
combination of moral, ethical, social, and legal commitments steer people
away from reliance on particular reasons for particular decisions.  Lexical
ordering cannot satisfy such commitments to exclusion either—including
the opposition to legislative history as a bad substitute for statutory text, and
the opposition to deference toward agencies as an illegitimate shift in power
away from judges.  Lexical ordering is rule-like in excluding information only
after judges decide that other sources are clear enough.
Nor is lexical ordering a conventional evidentiary form of conditional
relevance.  Information sometimes is deemed irrelevant in the sense of hav-
ing no value in helping to demonstrate a proposition of interest because
some other proposition is not possibly or not likely enough true.  Condi-
tional relevance is part of the law of evidence, which suggests that “when a
spoken statement is relied upon to prove notice to X, it is without probative
value unless X heard it.”101  This notion has companions in ordinary deci-
sionmaking.  Thus a rational employer may conclude that job applications
should not be evaluated unless the employer has adequate revenue to hire.
The basic idea is that certain information is not at all helpful unless a speci-
fied condition is met or assumed.
99 On the usefulness of plain meaning as a coordination device, without necessarily
defending lexical ordering, see David A. Strauss, Essay, Why Plain Meaning?, 72 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1565, 1565 (1997), and Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coor-
dinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231, 232, 250–56.  Compare also the
conventional rankings of influence for various subcategories of legislative history. See
KATZMANN, supra note 31, at 54.
100 See Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145, 156 (2013) (stating that
canons of construction are merely rules of thumb that “can tip the scales when a statute
could be read in multiple ways”).  I have set aside so-called conclusive presumptions that
function as rules of exclusion.
101 FED. R. EVID. 104 advisory committee’s note to the 1975 proposed rules; see FED. R.
EVID. 104(b) (requiring some proof of a fact if the relevance of evidence depends on that
fact).  Rule 104(b) does not spell out the dimensions of the idea, however, which seems
difficult to separate and reconcile with the rules’ broad notion of “relevance.” See Ronald
J. Allen, Essay, The Myth of Conditional Relevancy, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 871, 877 (1992) (“No
evidence is simply relevant in its own right.”); Richard D. Friedman, Conditional Probative
Value: Neoclassicism Without Myth, 93 MICH. L. REV. 439, 441–45 (1994) (illustrating classical
conditional relevance problems and the argument that such evidence is relevant under the
rules without evidence of the predicate, if the predicate is at least possibly true).
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The evidentiary idea is not enough to sustain the reach of lexical order-
ing in statutory cases today, however, as William Baude and Ryan Doerfler
point out.102  Nobody seems to maintain that legislative history and agency
interpretations cannot be “relevant,” in an evidentiary sense, to the issue of
how to understand or apply statutes unless the statutory text is otherwise
unclear.  Judges certainly can evaluate whether a committee report or an
agency’s view actually addresses the disputed issues in a case regardless of
whether other sources make the statute seem clear or unclear.  Theoretically,
judges need not make any estimate of statutory textual clarity to decide
whether such lower-tier sources have at least some value in understanding or
applying a given statute.103  It is just that many people contend that otherwise
clear statutory text should stop the analysis whether or not lower tier sources
speak directly to and support a different statutory meaning and a different
judgment.  That contention draws on a sense of propriety beyond evidentiary
relevance, and it should be grounded in a thoughtful normative theory of
interpretation.
2. Principled Beginnings
The theory is hard to build.  It cannot rest on the conclusion that, as
some courts have put it, “the best” evidence of legislative intent or statutory
meaning resides in a particular set of sources.104  However true, that conclu-
sion just does not recommend the multitiered structure at issue.  Identifying
102 See Baude & Doerfler, supra note 13, at 540, 547–49 (arguing that, at least ordina-
rily, evidence of statutory meaning is either relevant or not, rather than relevant only if
meaning is otherwise unclear).  Below, I take up the related yet distinct idea that higher-
tier and lower-tier sources implicate different judicial activities. See infra text accompany-
ing note 113.  In pursuing that line of argument, one might say that lower-tier sources are
not “relevant” to what the judge should do with the top-tier sources, because the two sepa-
rate categories of sources match up with two separate tasks.  But conditional relevance
issues in evidence do not seem to follow that logic.
103 The point is easier to make with legislative history, and the conclusion depends on
the rationale for considering the lower-tier source.  Consider, for example, the argument
that legislative history is worthless to the extent that legislators are unaware of it.  This
argument does depend on a factual predicate (unawareness) but not on statutory clarity.
Compare the argument that an agency interpretation is not valuable to the extent that the
agency has not been or may not be delegated interpretive authority by the legislature.  This
argument depends on a predicate (delegation) that can be logically connected to statutory
clarity, if we adopt a particular view about the foundations of deference: Some sources
suggest that deference is based on signs of legislative intent, see, e.g., United States v. Mead
Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–31 (2001) (referring to congressional expectations), and thus
statutory clarity could be taken to indicate that the legislature did not intend to delegate
interpretive authority to the agency.  But an alternative understanding is that legislative
intent is nonexistent on the matter of delegation and that deference is justified on institu-
tional grounds. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations
Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170, 1193–94 (2007).
104 E.g., People v. Bradford, 50 N.E.3d 1112, 1115 (Ill. 2016); see Scher v. Burke, 395
P.3d 680, 685 (Cal. 2017) (indicating that statutory text is generally the most reliable
source for legislative intent).
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the best source is no more supportive of lexical ordering than of assigning
heavy weight to that source within a mix of considerations.105  After all, Amer-
ican Trucking singled out statutory text as unsurpassed in importance for
ascertaining legislative purpose.106  Lexical ordering didn’t follow.
The principled proponent’s task is unenviable indeed.  It is to show that
top-tier sources are so important that lower-tier sources should have zero
effect on the decision no matter how persuasive the latter might be after
thoughtful consideration, unless the former are, in isolation, judged inade-
quate for decision—and yet the lower-tier sources must not be so unimpor-
tant or problematic that they should be excluded flatly.  This needle might
be threaded with sources that are morally fraught to the point of being nearly
illegitimate, which could be shunted aside for a last resort when other
sources are truly exhausted.107  Without extra motivation, however, such as
the need to economize on decision costs or clear dockets, this kind of princi-
pled justification must be rare.
For statutory interpretation, John Manning began the task of justifying
the demotion of purpose informed by legislative history.  He did not argue
decision costs or indecisiveness.108  Instead Manning contended that one
plausible version of purposivism itself would rule out the old notion of “the
spirit” of the law trumping law’s text, in favor of the position that clear statu-
tory text trumps evidence of background purposes.109  This version of
purposivism seeks to respect legislative choices between specific rules that
tightly constrain the discretion of interpreters and vague standards that effec-
tively delegate some implementation authority, while “enabl[ing]” Congress
to make such choices via statutory text.110  Manning pointed to endorse-
ments of clear statutory text’s primacy by judges who do not endorse
hardline textualism, and he admirably explored lexical ordering as a matter
of normative legal theory beyond pragmatic compromise.
Manning could be right about purposivism, and his work is thoughtful,
but the case for lexically ordered interpretation is incomplete.  Much of Man-
ning’s analysis is effective against purpose trumping statutory text as under-
stood with a limited set of sources; and this trumping might well hinder
105 See Kimmel v. State, 80 N.E.3d 370, 377 (N.Y. 2017) (observing that “the plain lan-
guage of the statute provides the best evidence of legislative intent” but without making
legislative history lexically inferior).
106 See United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) (“There is, of
course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute . . . .”).
107 See Samaha, Tiebreakers, supra note 13, at 1677–80.
108 See Manning, supra note 30, at 147–65 (stressing institutional settlement and consti-
tutional law).
109 See id. at 115–16, 129–32.
110 See id. at 147–48, 163–65; see also John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from
Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 96 (2006) (“[T]extualists believe that judicial adher-
ence to semantic detail (when clear) is essential if one wishes legislators to be able to strike
reliable bargains.”).
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Congress from using statutory text to make implemental choices.111  But the
Holy Trinity–style position under attack is a version of lexical ordering, and
knocking out the lexical superiority of purpose does not support the lexical
superiority of any other source.  The options for judges are not only which
sources to lexically order, but whether to lexically order at all.  Worth heavy
emphasis is that sources thought to be highly valuable (such as ordinary
meaning or judicial precedent) can be assigned extremely heavy weights in
an all-things-considered judgment, while sources considered less valuable
(such as floor debates or arcane canons) can be assigned extremely low
weights.  Or excluded.112  Lexically ordered interpretation should perform
better than these alternatives.
Another line of justification begins by associating different sources with
fundamentally different judicial activities.  For instance, we could acknowl-
edge that judges must decide statutory cases somehow, yet distinguish judg-
ments that rest on a narrow conception of statutory interpretation over
judgments that rest on additional grounds.113  Sources in every tier could be
useful in closing cases, but perhaps only sources in the top tier would be
thought useful in understanding the true meaning or intent of statutory text.
Lenity or a canon favoring veterans might be persuasively characterized as
useful for closing cases but not for understanding the meaning or intent of
enacted statutory language,114 while legislative history might be more diffi-
cult to separate on this basis.  Wherever the lines fall, the idea of partitioning
different kinds of sources into different categories of use is entirely logical.
All of that is a hopeful beginning but, again, stops short of a convincing
justification.  Standing alone, fundamental differences do not recommend
lexical ordering.  People regularly face the complication of relevant consider-
111 Judges also must determine how Congress has chosen to convey its implemental
choices, whether through ordinary meaning of enacted text, legislative history, or a combi-
nation.  Placing any source in a lexically superior tier might unjustifiably disable Congress’s
ability to convey messages in more than one way (and to divide its labor).  For discussion of
ex ante effects on the legislative drafting process, see notes 128 and 143 and accompanying
text.
112 A very low weight for a source category will make that category relatively uninfluen-
tial to decisions and thus possibly not worth the effort.  But that idea relies on decision
costs.
113 My thanks to Caleb Nelson and Ryan Doerfler for help in formulating this point.
For a relatively narrow conception of interpretation that is compatible with the notion in
the text above, see Lawrence B. Solum, Essay, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27
CONST. COMMENT. 95, 104 (2010).  Solum connects interpretation to evidence of language
usage. But cf. id. at 103 n.19 (slotting judicial application of legal norms into the category
of construction).  For a broader conception of interpretation, see Kent Greenawalt, Consti-
tutional and Statutory Interpretation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHI-
LOSOPHY OF LAW 268, 268–70 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002).  Greenawalt uses
the term to include, among other things, application to particular cases and stare decisis.
114 See Anita S. Krishnakumar, Reconsidering Substantive Canons, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 825,
833–34, 838–39, 878 (2017) (describing the conventional distinction between substantive
and semantic canons, while observing that substantive canons and evidence of legislative
intent might point in the same direction).
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ations that seem different in kind or measured on different scales of value,115
but lexical ordering is hardly the only response.116  Even if different source
categories initially must be thought about separately, decisionmakers may
strive to reconcile or combine their implications before reaching a final deci-
sion.  It happens every day, at least implicitly.  Additional argument is needed
to show that sources truly aimed at meaning, which sometimes will close
cases, should not always be mixed together with sources truly aimed at clos-
ing cases.  Both types of source would share an important function in closing
cases, after all, regardless of whether their overall value is difficult to estimate
and aggregate.  In starkest form, lexical ordering requires us to accept that
no amount of value in a lower-tier source will have any influence on decisions
in which top-tier sources tilt perceptibly in one direction or another.  Want-
ing a less rigid gateway to the lower tier suggests that those sources are not so
very categorically inferior in the first place.
The other stumbling block for this justification is artificial, but it empha-
sizes the artificiality of ideal decision situations.  Even if we assume a convinc-
ing basis for treating some sources as both different and fundamentally less
important—which has not been ruled out—the present argument for lexical
ordering depends on a problem of indecision.  The suggestion is that lower-
tier sources are categorically inferior grounds for judgment, yet they are
reserved for situations in which top-tier sources, regrettably, cancel out.  The
lower tier is created to solve this problem.  To distinguish relatively pure prin-
ciple from practical need, however, we assumed away this risk.  Judges in an
ideal world need not reserve inferior sources for a last resort that will never
be reached.  So, to prop up lexical ordering in statutory cases, we should
make our view of judicial decisionmaking less ideal, more realistic, and more
hard-bitten.
B. Nonideal Constraints
Additional hope for lexical ordering arrives when we add the problems
of decision costs and indecision risks.  The former is a standard consideration
in information economics and institutional design, while the latter problem
is less widely flagged.  Both provide rational reasons for decisionmakers to
ignore relevant information at times, which is a price that lexical ordering
exacts.  The challenge is identifying domains in which lexical ordering efforts
make convincingly good sense.  The analysis below suggests that the problem
of decision costs might support the lexical inferiority of legislative history,
while the problem of indecision might do so for agency interpretations.  The
more realistic we get, however, the more provisional our support should be.
115 See Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779,
796–98 (1994).
116 See Jeremy Waldron, Fake Incommensurability: A Response to Professor Schauer, 45 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 813, 815–16 (1994) (distinguishing dilemmas posed by strong incommensurabil-
ity problems from lexical priorities); see also Samaha, Tiebreakers, supra note 13, at 1677.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-1\NDL103.txt unknown Seq: 27 19-NOV-18 13:00
2018] lexical  ordering  in  statutory  interpretation 181
1. Decision Costs
Sensible decisionmaking accounts for not only decision quality but also
the costs of reaching decisions at various levels of quality.117  Although saying
so might be uncomfortable for judges, who must offer final judgments in
cases that affect the well-being of countless other people, at some point
increases in judicial decision costs will not be worth the predicted gains.
Likewise, we should care about upstream costs.  Knowing that judges will or
might consider a source category such as legislative history incentivizes law-
yers to research and argue the source, and, perhaps, encourages interested
parties to produce more of it in the first place.118
These old ideas generate fine reasons for judges to depart from an all-
inclusive approach to information, but alone they cannot justify lexical order-
ing.  First of all, some of today’s lexically inferior sources are cheap to pro-
cess.  Agency interpretations, if not subject to elaborate reasonableness
testing, give straightforward answers to litigated questions by definition.  The
rule of lenity is even cheaper.119  Second, outright exclusion is a handy solu-
tion for serious decision costs, as Adrian Vermeule emphasizes.120  If a source
category that is associated with substantial average decision costs has a 1%
chance of being useful to judges, then the expected value might well be low
enough to justify a rule of exclusion.121  If instead the chance of usefulness is
closer to 50%,122 the risk of valuable information loss might well be too high
to ever ignore the source.
Space for lexical ordering can open up, however, if its doctrinal hinge is
diagnostic.  The probability of a source category’s usefulness might vary
across case type, and the test for using lower-tier sources might help tell the
117 See, e.g., Avery Wiener Katz, Essay, The Economics of Form and Substance in Contract
Interpretation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 496, 524 (2004) (observing that a “broader context can
be purchased—but only at a cost of time and trouble, and of exacerbating certain incen-
tive problems”); Adam M. Samaha, Looking Over a Crowd—Do More Interpretive Sources Mean
More Discretion?, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 554, 561–62 (2017) [hereinafter Samaha, Looking Over a
Crowd] (invoking decision cost and decision quality trade-offs); Strauss, supra note 99, at
1565–66 (discussing the upside of agreement in low-stakes situations).
118 See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 110–12 (2006); Antonin Scalia
& John F. Manning, A Dialogue on Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation, 80 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1610, 1612 (2012) (“It’s there because we use it.”).
119 These sources must be assigned weight if included with a larger mix, which might
be difficult.  However, weighting might be done once categorically.  Anyway, weights are
implicitly assigned to source categories when they are allocated to lower tiers and a doctri-
nal hinge is built.
120 See VERMEULE, supra note 118, at 192–97.  Much of what I write here is consistent
with Vermeule’s analysis.  His objection to intermediate solutions, such as plain meaning
rules, was based on the asserted instability and inefficacy of the doctrines. See id. at 195–96.
Inefficacy of lexical ordering is an empirical question on which I report some evidence in
Part III.
121 For arguments supporting exclusion of legislative history when the benefits are
speculative, see VERMEULE, supra note 118, at 192–97.
122 See supra note 94; infra Section III.B (reporting results from a survey of appellate
judges).
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difference.  Suppose that a source category is useful in about 25% of all cases,
but this figure falls to 1% in one part of the docket and rises to 50% in the
remainder.  Sadly for the cause of quality, lexical ordering is rule-like in
instructing judges to ignore the content of the lower-tier source at issue while
deciding whether to exclude it.  But happily the chance of the lower-tier
source being useful partly depends on the persuasiveness of the top-tier
sources alone.123  When the top-tier sources are highly reliable and in
accord, even a crystal clear sign from a source such as legislative history is
very unlikely to influence the decision.  When instead the top-tier sources are
foggy and discordant, even a weak inference from a lower-tier source is likely
to make a difference.
A good hinge will save decision costs when the chance of usefulness is
intolerably low and will accept those costs when the chance is adequately
high.  The proper formulation for such a diagnostic test is not at all evident.
But vaguely asking judges to determine whether a statute seems otherwise
“clear” is not a poor start.  Judges could operationalize clarity to mean “very
unlikely, as a predictive matter and in general, that the lower-tier source cate-
gory will make a meaningful difference to the decision.”  If judges can make
this determination reliably and cheaply, and if considering the lower-tier
source would add substantial decision costs, then lexical ordering might be
justified.  The better judges are at distinguishing the 1% from the 50% useful
sources, the more likely that lexical ordering will outperform a quality-sacri-
ficing rule of exclusion or a cost-maximizing rule of inclusion.124
Still, this leaves many key values unknown or unconfirmed.  We have not
chosen values for each source category or for judicial decisions that use more
rather than less information.  Such generalizations are unavoidably imper-
fect, bound to vary across the docket, and contestable based on disagreement
over the appropriate judicial mission in statutory cases.  Without a sense of
the beneficial value of sources within various case types, however, judges can-
not be sure whether including, excluding, or demoting a given source is sen-
sible.  Nor do we have an evidence-backed estimate of how well judges can
123 This is most obviously true when “useful” is restricted to final judgments, as opposed
to estimating the difficulty of the decision or formulating doctrine.
124 From this perspective, lexical ordering resembles a “take the best, ignore the rest”
heuristic in which people facing heavy information loads screen out options using one or
two considerations. See Gerd Gigerenzer & Daniel G. Goldstein, Reasoning the Fast and
Frugal Way: Models of Bounded Rationality, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 650, 653 (1996); cf. Richard H.
Thaler et al., Choice Architecture, in THE BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY 428,
435–36 (Eldar Shafir ed., 2013) (describing elimination by aspects).  For an example and a
graphic rendering of a take-the-best algorithm that is consistent with lexical ordering, see
SANJIT DHAMI, THE FOUNDATIONS OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 1420–23 (2016).
Screening may rule out the option that would have been found best after thorough evalua-
tion.  The heuristic might or might not be rational depending on decision costs, stakes,
and other factors. See id. at 1427–28 (noting questions about the frequency with which
people use particular heuristics, and the appropriate benchmarks for evaluating them); cf.
Baude & Doerfler, supra note 13, at 551 (attempting to distinguish plain meaning rules
from heuristics in which some options are ruled out without making a final decision).
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identify—sight unseen—sources that are low value using a clarity test.  The
task will be difficult for source categories that are relatively unfamiliar, com-
plex, or diverse in quality across cases.  If judges operationalize the clarity test
loosely, to ordinarily allow consideration of lower-tier sources that might be
useful, then less cost will be saved.  There are no easy answers.
The decision-cost side of the analysis might be clearer, though.  Little
direct cost can be avoided by ignoring a single simple canon like lenity (or
severity), and the cost implications of deference to agencies depend on how
carefully judges analyze those positions.  If judges routinely defer to agencies
without serious reasonableness testing, then agency interpretations are not
promising candidates for lexical inferiority on a decision-cost basis.125  In
contrast, ignoring legislative history surely avoids substantial decision costs in
a fraction of cases.  Occasionally the arguably relevant legislative history is
new to the lawyers and judges, tens of thousands of words long, and requires
hours of work to understand, integrate, and contextualize thoughtfully.126  If
one assigns legislative history a low but nonzero value, then it becomes a
plausible candidate for lexical inferiority, assuming that the doctrinal hinge
is sufficiently diagnostic.
On the other hand, the work need not be done from scratch in each
case.  Research detailed in a court opinion should help adjudicate or settle
future cases.  Plus legislative history is a large category.  Subcategories of
high-value and low-cost history might be identified for the top tier—perhaps
past enactments and committee reports127—with the rest flatly excluded.
And we should seriously doubt that lexical ordering has a unique ex ante
effect on the legislative process or litigation.  True, a court’s firm commit-
ment to the lexical inferiority of a source category should affect the
probability of its influence on case results, as estimated by legislators, lawyers,
and other interested observers.  But theoretical effects on probability esti-
mates are not special to lexical ordering commitments; reweighting sources
125 A quick Step Two check for a reasonable interpretive choice by the agency, in
accord with conventional interpretive arguments, will cost judges little.  Judges will have
done the heavy analytical lifting at Step One.  A simple rule of deference to agencies for
unclear statutes will cost judges approximately nothing extra to execute.  We should add
any uncounted social costs associated with agencies producing these interpretations in the
hope of getting deference, but often the agency will produce a litigating position
regardless.
126 See VERMEULE, supra note 118, at 110 (highlighting examples).  The analysis above
simplifies matters by not breaking out the risk of judges erring in their understanding of
legislative history.
127 Cf. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395 (1951) (Jackson,
J., concurring) (contending that judges should only look to committee reports when
resorting to legislative history); Jorge L. Carro & Andrew R. Brann, The U.S. Supreme Court
and the Use of Legislative Histories: A Statistical Analysis, 22 JURIMETRICS J. 294, 304 tbl.2 (1982)
(indicating that, from 1938 to 1979, about 45% of the Supreme Court’s legislative history
citations were committee report references).  Carro and Brann’s table shows over 3300
citations to House and Senate committee reports out of 7465 total legislative history
citations.
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can have the same effect.128  Either way, we lack good measures of the lawyer,
staff, and judge time needed to process legislative history across case types, let
alone a settled number for what a judge’s time is worth.  Without more, lexi-
cal ordering remains a debatable response to the decision costs associated
with only some of the sources that are demoted by judges today.
2. Indecision Risks
There is another reason for lexical ordering, however: avoiding intolera-
ble ties.129  Sometimes decisionmakers find that two or more options are
equal on a given metric, or equal as far as they can tell with any confidence,
and yet one option must be selected.  For their part, judges are asked to
reach decisive resolutions, without fail, even for the most difficult issues.
During their careers, they will face some number of awfully close calls that
are practically no different from perfect ties.  And, as it happens, reserving a
source in a lexically inferior position tends to drive down the chance of all
sources canceling out, all else equal.  This finding rests on several simplifying
but not entirely unrealistic assumptions.
To illustrate, suppose that each source may strongly or weakly support
either side’s position in a case, or be unclear.  Suppose further that each
source is equally likely to bear any one of these five implications, and that the
judge will add up the implications of all sources considered.130  If all sources
cancel out—the unclear sources are no help, and the strong and weak impli-
cations for one side offset the strong and weak implications for the other
side—then the judge remains saddled with uncertainty.  Adjudication stalls
128 Judges flatly excluding legislative history could have an effect on the incentives for
interested parties to produce it, shape it, collect it, and substitute it for enacted text. Cf.
Vermeule, supra note 17, at 94–95 (noting such theories and scarce evidence).  One might
then guess that judges taking an all-inclusive approach would have the opposite incentive
effects, while the effects of lexical inferiority would lie somewhere in between.
But from an ex ante perspective, both lexical inferiority and a rule of inclusion gener-
ate positive probabilities of legislative history influencing court decisions, and the
probabilities do not really depend on which approach judges endorse.  An all-inclusive
approach requires source weights, explicit or implicit; less weight can be assigned to disfa-
vored source categories, which effectively reduces the probability that such sources will
influence court decisions.  Lexical ordering likewise affects the probability of influence
among source categories, albeit using distinctive doctrinal tools: depending on the doctri-
nal hinge, among other factors, lexical ordering generates a probability that judges will
consider and follow lower-tier sources—which is like lowering their expected weight.  With
lexical ordering, drafters theoretically can drive down the chance of judges considering
legislative history to zero by writing statutes very clearly.  But drafters should be able to
approximate that result with an all-inclusive approach, if legislative history is lightly
weighted or if drafters may instruct judges to ignore legislative history.  Drafters might or
might not believe that judges will follow the officially endorsed approach, and that the
official approach is sufficiently specific to guide judges, but these are issues for all of the
competing approaches on which more evidence is needed.
129 See Samaha, Tiebreakers, supra note 13, at 1685–1700.
130 We might hope that the relevant sources will not tend toward equipoise.  But we are
modeling litigation, which often involves represented parties contesting legally hard cases.
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or turns lawless without more.  One response is to increase the number of
sources considered within the system.  Whatever conventional wisdom might
suggest, adding sources will increase decision costs but also should increase
decision quality and, more to the point, will tend to increase decisiveness in
this model.131  On the above assumptions, moving from one to five such
sources reduces the probability of an overall tie from 20% to about 12%.132
An alternative is lexical ordering.  Judges may demote one source into a
lexically inferior tiebreaking position, to be considered only when the other
source inferences add up to a tie.  Doing so presumably will yield somewhat
lower quality decisions but can save decision costs and, more to the point, will
tend to drive down the chance of a tie even faster than mixing all sources
together.  On the above assumptions, moving from one to five sources with
one source reserved for tiebreaking reduces the probability of an overall tie
from 20% to under 3%.133  If judges choose a tiebreaker that always supports
one side or another without ever being unclear itself, then the risk of an
overall tie falls to zero.134
Thus, for promoting decisiveness, agency interpretation is a better can-
didate for the lower tier than legislative history—the opposite implication
from our analysis of decision costs.  Litigated agency interpretations are more
decisive than legislative history, as a category, in the sense of plainly favoring
a unique case result, as long as judges do not complicate matters with serious
reasonableness testing.  Legislative history often requires significant thought
without a guaranteed implication in one direction or another.  The rule of
lenity is an even cleaner tiebreaker, offering unmatched speed and decisive-
ness once considered.  Lenity can close every hard criminal case, agency
interpretations can close hard civil cases when a deference-eligible agency
position is available, and legislative history holds some chance of closing the
remainder of the civil docket.135
131 See Samaha, Looking Over a Crowd, supra note 117, at 572–75 (relying on permuta-
tion tables and simulations).  The allied intuition is that tossing lots of sources together,
like tossing lots of coins, is not likely to yield an exactly equal number of implications
pointing in different directions. See id. at 575.  On the phenomena of judges cherry pick-
ing and spinning sources, see id. at 582–89.
132 See id. at 572, 573 fig.1, 574 fig.2.  Decisionmakers cannot always add information,
sensibly or at all.  First, decision costs tend to rise.  Second, decision quality might actually
suffer at some point if the decision protocol becomes complicated or loaded with informa-
tion. See id. at 590–93.  Third, the number of relevant sources has an upper bound.  Peo-
ple can develop new understandings of legislative history, for instance, but the primary
sources presumably are capped by what happened in the past.
133 See Samaha, Tiebreakers, supra note 13, at 1691, 1693 fig.6.  In multiple-source situa-
tions, holding one source aside does tend to increase the chance of a tie among the
remaining sources, but this increase is more than offset by the decisive power of the
tiebreaker.
134 See id. at 1694.
135 See id. at 1714–16.  In criminal cases, federal judges leave lenity in a last resort tier
below legislative history, and they rule out agency deference. See id.  In civil cases, federal
judges have yet to settle on how to treat legislative history when an agency interpretation is
available. See supra note 89.
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As with decision costs, however, the decisiveness justification for lexical
ordering turns on unresolved valuation issues.  One question is the frequency
of ties in litigation, either objectively or as felt by judges.  Judges should sacri-
fice less to avoid rare events.  And sacrifice they must.  Lexical ordering
obtains gains in decisiveness, and somewhat lower decision costs, at the
expense of a more complete picture of the universe of valid sources and their
interactions in some fraction of cases.136  Following our numerical illustra-
tion, the probability of an incorrect result is 8% with two sources and one of
them a tiebreaker; with five such sources, the probability of such error falls to
around 5%—but not zero.137  Judges can reduce the risk of incorrect case
results by carefully selecting weaker sources for the tiebreaking tier, but they
cannot eliminate the inaccuracy risks.138  More work is required to firmly
conclude that such trade-offs are justified.  We can only add indecision risks
as a plausible if supplemental reason for lexically ordering certain types of
sources.
* * *
TABLE 1:  COMPARING APPROACHES, THEORETICALLY
Inclusion Lexical Ordering Exclusion
Confronting Trade-offs
Cost High Middling Low
Quality High Middling Low
Decisiveness Middling High Low
Building Good Hinges – Diagnostic, sight unseen –
Choosing Tiebreakers – Costly, shoddy, decisive –
Note: Weighting sources is required for all three approaches, but less so with fewer sources.
Now we can consolidate several lessons, as a matter of general theory
applied to net-positive-value categories of sources. Excluding sources will tend
to minimize decision costs, but also reduce decision quality and decisiveness.
Including sources will tend to have the opposite effects, maximizing decision
136 See Samaha, Tiebreakers, supra note 13, at 1694–98 (illustrating erroneous results and
other information losses numerically, then introducing the possibility of “double counting”
by placing a source in both higher and lower tiers).  Overt double counting is a logically
promising option, but it is not the focus of contemporary debate or legal practice.
Randomization to break ties does not require information losses. See id. at 1689–91.  But
overt randomization often is not available to resolve legal disputes. See GUIDO CALABRESI &
PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 41–44 (1978) (critiquing lotteries and comparing other
allocation rules).
137 See Samaha, Tiebreakers, supra note 13, at 1694 n.86, 1696 fig.8.
138 See id. at 1695, 1696 figs.8 & 9 (showing percentages of overlooked ties in or near
single digits, and a much higher percentage of cases in which top-tier sources differ from
the aggregated implications of all sources).
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quality and increasing decisiveness but maximizing decision costs, too. Lexi-
cally ordering sources will tend toward a unique mixture of effects depending,
importantly, on which sources are placed in which tiers and how the doctri-
nal hinge between tiers is built.  If the tiers are sensibly populated and if the
hinge quickly and effectively separates cases in which lower-tier sources are
less and more likely useful, then lexical ordering will tend toward a middling
range of decision costs, a middling range of decision quality, and the highest
rate of decisiveness.  Loosening the hinge to lower-tier sources will push lexi-
cal ordering toward inclusion of those sources; tightening the hinge will push
toward exclusion.
C. Convenient Compromise
There is another conceivable defense, or at least explanation, for lexi-
cally ordered statutory interpretation.  Judges might try to build a united
front on broad methodological issues, partly to guide decisionmaking and
partly for public relations.  Many observers seem to support interpretive
methods that reflect orderly decisionmaking with minimal influence from
the personal opinions of the judges who happen to sit on cases.139  Many
judges themselves, especially in lower courts, might want sharp guidance for
at least getting started on the millrun of statutory cases.  And an official
method for an entire court system might help observers plan their affairs or
draft legislation.  At the same time, some number of judges disagree deeply
over the proper method and mission for statutory cases.  Methodological
compromises that are too ambitious will lose support from judges at the
extremes—absent effective means of policing how judges actually think—
while compromises that are too modest will not guide judges or gain respect
from observers who care.
Even with a demand for compromise, we have to wonder why lexical
ordering with a clarity test would be part of it, in various fields, times, and
jurisdictions.  As a start, we may largely rule out a hardline textualism that
flatly excludes legislative history and deference to agencies.  That option is
opposed by too many judges in most jurisdictions to succeed as a global com-
promise, for now.  For now, we also can doubt the widespread viability of an
all-inclusive approach with low weights for legislative history and agency
interpretations.140  That option is plausible as a logical matter, and it might
139 See Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827, 887
(1988) (suggesting the vulnerability on this ground of judges using an eclectic mix of
open-ended factors); see also Micah Schwartzman, Essay, Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L. REV.
987, 1004, 1006 (2008) (contending that legitimacy requires that officials have reasons that
others can understand and accept as a matter of principle, and that judges’ reasons should
be given publicly); cf. Gluck & Posner, supra note 16, at 1341–43, 1353 (reporting that
several interviewed circuit judges were concerned about “legitimacy” when resolving statu-
tory cases, partly in terms of public support).
140 See Jonathan T. Molot, Ambivalence About Formalism, 93 VA. L. REV. 1, 51–52 (2007)
(suggesting a source-inclusive approach that nonetheless assigns heavy weight to textualist
clues).
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track judicial practice in many chambers.  But something like an all-inclusive
approach was tried out as the official line on interpretation in many courts by
the 1970s and, arguably, was thought not to produce enough guidance and
observer respect.  The source weights never reached number-like rigidity, of
course.  As an alternative, plain meaning rules were familiar and could be
grabbed off the doctrinal shelf to support a renewed compromise.141
On the other hand, plain meaning rules already had their day in court,
too, in the early twentieth century.  Guidance was not their strong suit, really,
and their connection to rule-of-law values was unproved.  The contemporary
form of lexically ordered statutory interpretation is likewise.  It relies on a
hazy clarity test plus multiple sources that still must be assigned weights, if
only implicitly.142  And to the extent that lexical ordering effectively weights
lower-tier sources, we should doubt that it has any unique ability to calibrate
ex ante incentives for lawyers and legislatures.143  It tends to moderate the
expected influence of lower-tier sources in court, for whatever that’s worth,
rather than offer an especially instructive backdrop for predicting case results
or drafting legislation.  Which means that observers need not have been
greatly impressed by judicial announcements that lexical ordering was back
in fashion.  We still have to wonder why many judges would re-endorse lexical
ordering for statutory cases by the 1990s.
One possibility is that lexical ordering instructions are more effective
than the skeptics suppose, and that judges largely know and tolerate the
resulting trade-offs.144  The decision-cost savings from ignoring sources like
legislative history are substantial, and they grew to the extent that legislatures
produced more of it per code provision over time.145  Agency interpreta-
tions, where they exist, are highly likely to offer decisive answers to hard
interpretive questions.  Judges might have learned all this over time.  Or if no
new lessons were learned, then the mix of methodological commitments on
the bench by the 1990s might have returned to about what it was in the
1920s.  Furthermore, observers might have picked up on the actual bite of
lexical ordering instructions, then adjusted their confidence levels and
behavior accordingly.  Abbe Gluck’s suggestion that lexical ordering likely
increases predictability in statutory cases is broadly consistent with these
thoughts.146  Sure, in some cases judges might abandon the compromise in
141 See, e.g., Gluck, supra note 12, at 1758–59, 1842–43 (identifying lexical ordering as a
viable state-level compromise that is text centric yet not hardline textualism, and that
might discipline and legitimize purposivism).
142 See supra text accompanying note 89.
143 See supra note 128.
144 See supra Section II.B.
145 Cf. Richard A. Danner, Justice Jackson’s Lament: Historical and Comparative Perspectives
on the Availability of Legislative History, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 151, 168–70 (2003)
(discussing increased production and distribution of congressional committee reports and
floor debate transcripts in the late 1800s and thereafter).
146 See Gluck, supra note 12, at 1856–57 (comparing tiering to open-ended eclecticism).
Gluck recognized the presence of debatable empirical questions here. See id. at 1858.
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favor of other strong commitments,147 but the identified trade-offs would
persist.
Another possibility is that lexical ordering became popular with judges
because the instructions have little bite, just as the skeptics suppose, even
when judges try to follow the instructions.  Judges might then comfortably
declare a strong commitment to plain meaning, when they happen to see it,
without losing or gaining very much.  This could be true for several different
reasons.  Perhaps the instructions are comprehensive and the clarity test has
real meaning to judges, but in operation the test yields results that conve-
niently fit different judges’ methodological commitments.  Judges’ unadul-
terated propensity to see clarity might rise along with their principled
opposition to lower-tier sources.148  Or perhaps the instructions are too vacu-
ous to prevent conscious or unconscious manipulation by judges.  Judges’
tactically inflected propensity to see clarity might depend on their attraction
to a given lower-tier source.149  Or perhaps judges cannot actually ignore
lower-tier sources in practice, regardless of their feelings about those
sources.150  None of these depictions seem useful for producing public
respect, let alone influencing legislation.  But perhaps adequate levels of
observer respect are taken for granted or easily sustained.
Some of the above possibilities depend on judges understanding the
effects of lexical ordering instructions, while others do not.  Yet each one of
these positive and normative theories depends on conjecture about judicial
behavior.  Some theories suppose that lexical ordering has a significant effect
on judicial decisionmaking, while others suppose not.  And it is not hard to
imagine that lexically ordered statutory interpretation became popular again
by the 1990s without a thorough evaluation of the consequences for judicial
decisionmaking, litigation behavior, and legislative drafting.  Nobody fully
understands the consequences today, actually.
Fortunately, many of the theories are testable to an extent.  We do not
have to rest with casual speculation about judges and impressions from their
opinions.  Instead we need evidence of how lexical ordering actually works.
147 See id. at 1757 (suggesting that an agreed-upon methodology might increase fair-
ness, predictability, and coordination by guiding judicial decisions in “less politically
charged cases,” if not in “hard cases”).
148 See infra Section III.B.  Supreme Court opinions apparently offer an accommoda-
tion to justices who oppose the use of legislative history: they are not required to consult it
even if the statute is otherwise unclear. See Honeycutt v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1626,
1635 (2017) (“For those who find [legislative history] relevant . . . .”); Milner v. Dep’t of
Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 574 (2011) (“[F]or those who take it into account . . . .”). Chevron
doctrine has no such accommodation, thus far, perhaps because many textualists have not
yet repudiated deference.
149 See infra Section III.C.  Consider the position of two textualists, who observed that
the plain meaning rule is “essentially sound but largely unhelpful, since determining what
is unambiguous is eminently debatable.” SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 15, at 436.
150 See infra Section III.C.
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III. IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES
Machines can lexically order information without difficulty, we know.
Indeed a patch of scholarship on machine learning uses lexical ordering to
develop search strategies.151  But of course people often process information
differently from machines, and the specifics of how people process condi-
tionally relevant information are still emerging.  The discussion below begins
with a review of suggestive prior research, which for the most part does not
test lexical ordering instructions or does not test judges, and then reports
results from a new survey and vignette experiment.  All told, the evidence
indicates curiously mixed judicial success at lexical ordering—and therefore
a revised picture of the trade-offs.
A. Prior Research
Ordinary people are not always motivated to ignore information and,
even if fully motivated, they might not be able to ignore it on purpose.152
One version of the challenge involves evidence suppression instructions that
backfire, making people more likely to rely on information that they have
been told to forget.153  More generally, exposure to some information can
influence how people process other information.154  These phenomena pose
implementation challenges when decisionmakers have easy access to sources
that are supposed to be reserved for contingencies.155
For their part, judges might be in a special class with special abilities.156
Yet their decision environments are not designed to enhance the success of
lexical ordering.  Judges have easy access to the lower-tier sources that they
151 See, e.g., Michael Schmitt & Laura Martignon, On the Complexity of Learning Lexico-
graphic Strategies, 7 J. MACH. LEARNING RES. 55, 57–58 (2006).
152 See Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information?: The Difficulty
of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1260, 1262 (2005).
153 Mock jury research on curative instructions investigates this backfire phenomenon,
with mixed findings. See id. at 1276 & n.107 (collecting studies).  For ironic process theory
generally, see Daniel M. Wegner, Ironic Processes of Mental Control, 101 PSYCHOL. REV. 34, 35
(1994).
154 See Wistrich et al., supra note 152, at 1264–70.  A related example appears in first-
impressions research where evaluations sometimes are more heavily influenced by early
information. See, e.g., Kurt A. Carlson et al., Leader-Driven Primacy: Using Attribute Order to
Affect Consumer Choice, 32 J. CONSUMER RES. 513, 513–15 (2006).
155 See Wistrich et al., supra note 152, at 1275–76 (generalizing that efforts to ignore
inadmissible information are more likely to succeed if the information is (1) of questiona-
ble credibility, (2) unnecessary to reach a sound decision, (3) not especially salient and not
emotionally charged, or (4) not combined with a heavy cognitive load).
156 See Frederick Schauer, Is There a Psychology of Judging?, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDI-
CIAL DECISION MAKING 103, 104–05 (David Klein & Gregory Mitchell eds., 2010) (discussing
the possibility that judges are unique decisionmakers with regard to legal interpretation);
cf. Stephan Landsman & Richard F. Rakos, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Effect of Potentially
Biasing Information on Judges and Jurors in Civil Litigation, 12 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 113, 125–26
(1994) (concluding that neither judges nor potential jurors were able, when instructed, to
ignore evidence of subsequent remedial measures taken by a defendant in a tort case).  On
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are supposed to bracket mentally, partly because generous rules of advocacy
allow lawyers to emphasize basically any interpretive source that they think
useful to their cause.  We have to wonder what happens to lexical ordering
efforts in court, absent special precautions.
A problem area is the “clarity” test, which might be too vague to prevent
judges from accessing or blocking lower-tier sources at will.  This concern
gains some support from vignette experiments conducted by Ward Farns-
worth, Dustin Guzior, and Anup Malani.157  First-year law students were less
likely to respond that, in their opinion, criminal statutes were ambiguous
when the students’ policy preferences were strong.158  On the other hand,
this negative correlation tended to disappear when the question was phrased
as whether ordinary readers would likely disagree about the better mean-
ing.159  Thus a thoughtfully framed clarity question might cheaply reduce the
influence of extralegal preferences.  Either way, however, cognitive chal-
lenges persist for lexical ordering.  Judges must ignore the implications of
lower-tier sources while working with top-tier sources, whether or not their
policy preferences are engaged.  The Farnsworth group’s study was not
designed to examine the influence of lower-tier sources.  In addition, as the
authors rightly suggest, we should hesitate to draw inferences about judicial
behavior from student respondents.160
More recently, Dan Kahan and colleagues found that judges and lawyers
did respond differently from law students and the general public.161  The
Kahan team drafted two vignettes in which criminal statutes were supposed
to be ambiguous, and then manipulated the descriptions of vignette charac-
ters in legally irrelevant ways.  Thus a littering case involved water dispensers
left at the U.S.–Mexico border, either by immigrant aid workers or by border
fence construction workers.162  The judges and lawyers tended to find no
violation of the statute regardless of the manipulation, nor did their judg-
ments correlate with their estimated cultural worldviews,163 but the law stu-
dents and general public respondents showed greater sensitivity to the
research suggesting that experts are more confident than nonexperts and yet may exhibit
various cognitive biases, see DHAMI, supra note 124, at 1449–50.
157 See Farnsworth et al., supra note 17, at 260–62.
158 See id. at 266–68.  The students apparently were not asked for their final judgments,
however. See id. at 260–62.
159 See id. at 271–72, 292.
160 See id. at 272–73.
161 See Dan M. Kahan et al., “Ideology” or “Situation Sense”? An Experimental Investigation of
Motivated Reasoning and Professional Judgment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 349, 374–75 (2016) (com-
paring responses from state trial and appellate judges, lawyers in several states, students
from five law schools, and a nationally representative sample of the public).
162 See id. at 380–83.
163 See id. at 394, 396 (showing point estimates); id. at 397–402 (showing regressions
and Bayesian analysis).  The surveys did not ask about the respondents’ immigration policy
preferences, but the respondents’ cultural outlooks were estimated in accord with Cultural
Cognition Worldview Scales. See id. at 376.
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manipulation.164  The experiment studied legally irrelevant facts rather than
lexically inferior sources.  However, these facts were ideologically charged
and, regardless, the results suggest that judges fall within a special category of
legal decisionmakers.
Those results are broadly consistent with a study of treaty interpretation
by Yahli Shereshevsky and Tom Noah.165  Their vignettes asked international
law experts and international law students about treaty violations,166 expos-
ing the treatment groups to treaty preparatory work.  The students, but not
the experts, seemed inappropriately influenced by the exposure.  Isolating
those experts who reported that the applicable rule of construction required
lexical ordering as well as the exclusion of preparatory work, the authors
could not confirm that exposure to preparatory work influenced judgments
about treaty violations.167  As for possible effects of lower-tier sources on
ambiguity determinations, Shereshevsky and Noah note that there was no
treatment effect in either expert vignette, but that there was a treatment
effect in a student vignette involving deportation and terrorism.168  It is
worth pointing out that the experts and students were not given the same
vignettes.  Also, few of the experts were judges or arbitrators; about two-thirds
were academics.169  Although judges and academics might behave similarly
in vignette experiments, we do not have much evidence to go on.  That cau-
tionary note aside, the study does suggest that legal professionals can at least
sometimes lexically order sources when interpreting legal texts.
In potential contrast, consider a labor-intensive experiment in which
judges dealt with an international war crime charge.  Holger Spamann and
Lars Klo¨hn asked a group of mostly federal trial-level judges to expend up to
fifty minutes reading facts, statutory text, and briefs, with access to the
164 See id. at 394, 396–402.
165 See Yahli Shereshevsky & Tom Noah, Does Exposure to Preparatory Work Affect Treaty
Interpretation? An Experimental Study on International Law Students and Experts, 28 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 1287 (2017).
166 See id. at 1294, 1303 & n.57 (noting that the law students were enrolled in interna-
tional law courses in Israel and that the experts were recruited from various online West-
ern sources).
167 See id. at 1297–1300, 1305–06, 1308–09 (reporting results for “Hypothesis 2”).
Their Hypothesis 2 is comparable to our Hypothesis 2, which is described below in subsec-
tion III.C.2.  Other, more complex departures from lexical ordering instructions are possi-
ble and deserve study, as well.
168 See id. at 1297 n.38.  The student vignette with the treatment effect involved the
deportation of a member of Hamas who had helped plan terrorist attacks. See id. at 1298.
The experts were not given that deportation vignette.  The expert vignettes involved the
arbitration of a contract (not given to the students) and the detention of a drunk man
(given to the students).
169 See id. at 1303 (noting that four of 212 experts were international judges or arbitra-
tors); id. at 1313 (flagging the possibility that international law experts might be relatively
formalistic, in response to concerns that international law is not lawlike).
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lengthy trial chamber opinion and an appellate chamber precedent.170  Vari-
ations in the materials were intended to portray the nonbinding precedent as
either weakly favoring or weakly opposing the defendant’s position on the
statute, and to portray the defendant as more or less sympathetic in legally
irrelevant ways.  The judges’ willingness to affirm the conviction was signifi-
cantly influenced by the legally irrelevant description of the defendant, but
not by the difference in the precedent’s content.171  The number of judges
in each condition was small,172 trial judges were asked to behave as appellate
judges in an unfamiliar international law context, and lexical ordering was
not at issue.  But the experimental setting was more realistic than most, and
an effect from defendant characteristics was more challenging to find with a
small number of respondents.  It is not obvious how to reconcile these results
with other studies.173
Finally, judges achieved mixed success at ignoring inadmissible evidence
in experiments by Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey Rachlinski, and Andrew Wistrich.174
In one experiment, trial judges received a description of a $200 armed rob-
bery, and the treatment group was informed that the defendant confessed
during an interrogation that persisted after he asked for a lawyer.175  The
treatment group judges who ruled that the confession was inadmissible were
not significantly more willing to convict than were the control group
judges.176  In a follow-up experiment, the Guthrie team added variations in
the severity of charges and the police misconduct.177  This time the pattern
of influence was complex.  “More severe police misconduct reduced the
judges’ willingness to convict” compared to mild misconduct, “but only for a
less serious crime.”178  When instead the defendant was charged with robbery
170 See Holger Spamann & Lars Klo¨hn, Justice Is Less Blind, and Less Legalistic, than We
Thought: Evidence from an Experiment with Real Judges, 45 J. LEGAL STUDS. 255, 260–62, 261 n.4
(2016).
171 See id. at 268–72; id. at 256, 264–65, 273 (emphasizing that the precedent was meant
to be only a weak source—either a brief dictum or plausibly distinguishable on its facts).
172 See id. at 269 tbl.2 (reporting results with six to eleven judges in each of four
conditions).
173 See id. at 259 (suggesting greater cognitive load and the “personal implications” of
varying the defendant portrayal as possible influences).  Perhaps the portrayals of the
defendants were rather easy for these judges to understand and process, in contrast to the
rest of the subject matter.
174 See Wistrich et al., supra note 152, at 1258–59, 1286–1312.
175 See id. at 1320–21, 1344–45.
176 See id. at 1321; see also id. at 1316, 1342–43 (reporting results of an experiment in
which exposure to the fruits of a car search did not significantly affect the judges’ determi-
nations of probable cause).
177 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Altering Attention in Adjudication, 60 UCLA L. REV.
1586, 1611–13 (2013) (noting that the bank robbery involved $520 and that some judges
were told about an ensuing murder of a young mother; and that judges were either not
told about a confession, told about a written confession after the police twice refused the
defendant’s request for a lawyer, or told about the same confession after nine hours of
police threats and other misconduct).
178 Id. at 1614.
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plus murder, “the judges who had heard confessions, however obtained, were
consistently more willing to convict.”179
Perhaps lexically ordered statutory interpretation is easier for judges to
handle.  The inadmissible evidence experiments include emotionally
charged material of a kind not present in the ordinary lower-tier source for
statutory cases.  But we have awfully little on-point evidence.  To understand
how lexical ordering operates in our judiciaries, we need a better grip on
how judges use clarity tests and how lower-tier sources influence
interpretation.
B. Clarity Survey
On that score, many commentators have doubted that clarity tests can
have much effect on judges.180  One version of the idea is that a clarity test
will have little bite across different methodological commitments.  Even if
judges do ignore lower-tier sources when applying the clarity test, each judge
might reach a happy ending on the legal relevance of those sources if the
tendency to find statutes clear is correlated with the tendency to find lower-
tier sources useless.  Judges who are skeptical (enthusiastic) about legislative
history might usually conclude that statutory text is otherwise clear (unclear).
This pattern could hold even if judges engage in no case-specific manipula-
tion of the test.
A simple way to gain evidence on this point is to ask judges about their
experiences.  Approximately one hundred appellate judges from around the
country were presented with general questions about text and legislative his-
tory.181  Each judge was asked, “based on your experience deciding statutory
cases, how often do you end up thinking that the statute’s text is ambiguous
or vague,” on a scale of 1 to 7 (1 indicated never and 7 indicated always).
Each judge also was asked, “based on your experience deciding statutory
cases that involve legislative history, how often is the legislative history useful
to you,” on the same kind of scale.  If a judge’s ability or willingness to find
textual clarity is associated with the judge’s lack of attraction to legislative
history, then we might see the numerical responses on these questions run-
179 Id.  For another of the few studies on expert ability to ignore information, consider
the fascinating treatment of fingerprint analysis in Itiel E. Dror et al., Contextual Information
Renders Experts Vulnerable to Making Erroneous Identifications, 156 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 74, 76
(2006).  The study took place in the experts’ workplace, with collaborators asking experts
to give an opinion on a terrorism case that had been adjudicated.  One set of collaborators
told their experts that a match had been confirmed in the terrorism case.  In truth, the
experts were not given fingerprints from the terrorism case, but instead given fingerprints
that the experts themselves had analyzed in a real prior case and had concluded did not
match.  Most of the experts who were given the promatch indication changed their judg-
ment to match or unclear.  The number of experts in the study was small, but understanda-
bly so given the impressive research design.
180 See supra notes 15–17 (collecting sources).
181 For additional details on the survey, see subsection III.C.1, which notes that most of
the judge respondents were state judges who had served for four or fewer years in their
current positions.
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ning together and perhaps clumping toward the high and low ends of the
scales.
The results provide only soft support for the suggested pattern.  Figure 1
is a scatterplot of responses.182  Some judges did indicate that statutory text is
usually vague while legislative history is usually useful, and a larger group
gave the opposite combination of responses.  But those groups did not domi-
nate.  The combined fraction of survey responses that were below four for
both questions or above four for both questions comprised less than one-
third of the sample.  While the responses on textual vagueness clustered at
three, four, and five, the responses on legislative history’s usefulness were
fairly spread out.  The correlation between the numerical responses on the
two questions is weak (r = 0.09) and not statistically significant at conven-
tional levels (p = 0.38).  Surely some judges have general tendencies that
make the clarity test insignificant to them, but the size of this carefree group
is open to question and it might well be small.  Which would tend to preserve
the hard trade-offs identified in Section II.B.
These measures are imperfect, of course.  The responses are self-
reported generalizations at one point in time, and not every judge necessarily
had in mind the same conception of legislative history.183  Furthermore, a
judge’s estimate of legislative history’s usefulness in general could be influ-
enced by recent exposure to a concrete example.  Our treatment group of
judges was given a reference to committee reports,184 which have become
controversial, and the reports were in tension with some other sources.  This
could pull down the treatment group’s estimate of legislative history’s useful-
ness.185  The treatment group’s mean for the usefulness question (3.71) was
about one-half point lower than the control group’s mean (4.24).  However,
this difference is not statistically significant at conventional levels (p = 0.14),
and an ordered probit analysis fails to confirm a treatment effect on the use-
fulness response (p = 0.238).  Exposure to committee reports probably did
not have a large effect on these responses.
182 One judge wrote “3–4” in response to both questions.  That survey is excluded from
Figure 1.
183 See supra subsection I.B.1 (observing that available state-level legislative history var-
ies).  Perhaps some judges who reported that legislative history is not usually useful to
them are trying to tell us that they are blocked from making legislative history useful
because they follow a plain meaning rule and usually conclude that the text is clear.  I
attempted to avoid this problem with the wording of the question, which asks about “cases
that involve legislative history.”
184 See infra subsection III.C.1 (detailing the vignettes).
185 It is not obvious how such a downward pull would affect the correlation between
responses on the legislative history and statutory clarity questions.  As it happens, this cor-
relation looks weaker in the treatment group (r = -0.03, p = 0.83) than in the control group
(r = 0.19, p = 0.20), but neither correlation is statistically significant at conventional levels.
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FIGURE 1: Scatterplot of appellate judge survey responses, 2016–2017
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C. Vignette Experiment
Our survey collected some general impressions from judges.  We need
another approach to better understand the interplay between tiers of
sources.  Below are the results from a vignette experiment that begins to mea-
sure judicial sensitivity to particular lower-tier sources in particular cases.
1. Participants and Procedure
All of the participants were sitting appellate judges.  Of the 102 respon-
dents, eighty-six were attendees at two seminars for new appellate judges
from around the country,186 and another sixteen were intermediate appel-
late judges in a Midwestern state who attended an in-house educational con-
186 The Institute of Judicial Administration’s New Appellate Judges Seminar is held
annually in the summer.  The experiment was conducted at the 2016 and 2017 Seminars.
A different group of student judges attends each year.
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ference.  Most respondents were serving on a state court (seventy-eight),
others were federal circuit court judges (eight) and military judges (ten), and
a few respondents left this question unanswered (six).  Most of the judges in
the pool had fewer than five years of experience in their current positions,
which was a requirement for student judges attending the two seminars.187
However, the majority of the student judge attendees had prior judicial expe-
rience of another kind, such as in a trial court,188 and nearly all judges in the
Midwestern judges group had served for at least five years on that court.  We
cannot identify the experience level of each respondent, though.  To protect
anonymity and to increase response rates, the survey did not include demo-
graphic questions.
Each judge received two hypothetical cases to decide by paper and pen-
cil survey.  The vignettes are reproduced in Appendices A and B.  In Trade
Name, one company claims that another company is unlawfully using the
same name for a different drug.  The plaintiff company is not yet selling its
drug on the market, however, and the disputed issue is whether presale safety
testing counts as being “used in commerce openly” under a quoted stat-
ute.189  In Election Law, plaintiff employees who were paid an hourly wage
claim that their employer unlawfully refused to pay them for the time that
they left work to go vote.  The disputed issue is whether such refusal to pay
counts as “penalizing . . . with a reduction in wages” under a quoted
statute.190
187 See INST. OF JUDICIAL ADMIN., New Appellate Judges Seminar, N.Y.U. L., http://www
.law.nyu.edu/centers/judicial/appellatejudgesseminar (last visited August 25, 2018).
188 See New Appellate Judges Seminar: 2016 Attendees, IJA REPORT (The Inst. of Judicial
Admin., New York, N.Y.), Fall 2016, at 11–22, https://issuu.com/nyuija/docs/final_ija_
newsletter_highres (showing that fifteen of twenty-nine nonmilitary confirmed student
judge attendees had prior judicial experience); New Appellate Judges Seminar: July 16–27,
2017 Attendees, IJA REPORT (The Inst. of Judicial Admin., New York, N.Y.), Winter 2017, at
6–21, https://issuu.com/nyuija/docs/ija_report_winter_2017_final_single (showing that
twenty-five of forty-two nonmilitary attendees had such prior experience).  Faculty judges
have more experience than the student judges.  At the 2016 Seminar, both student and
faculty judges were allowed to participate to keep the number of respondents up.  Because
several of the same faculty judges attended the 2017 Seminar, these faculty judges were
excluded from the pool.
189 I use “trade name” loosely; this vignette is a variation on a federal trademark law
issue. Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (defining “use in commerce”); Kythera Biopharmaceuti-
cals, Inc. v. Lithera, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 2d 890, 899 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (“Shipments of drugs
for clinical testing may be a sufficient use in commerce to show a protectable interest.”); S.
REP. NO. 100-515, at 44–45 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5607 (stating
that the definition should be interpreted flexibly to include less traditional uses such as
“ongoing shipments of a new drug to clinical investigators”).  This issue seems fairly
obscure for appellate judges, especially state judges.
190 This vignette is a variation on pay-while-voting disputes from the mid-twentieth cen-
tury. Cf. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 422 n.1, 425 (1952) (rejecting a
constitutional challenge to a state statute that expressly referred to a “penalty” or “deduc-
tion of wages”); State v. Int’l Harvester Co., 63 N.W.2d 547, 550 (Minn. 1954) (similar);
People v. Ford Motor Co., 63 N.Y.S.2d 697, 697 (N.Y. App. Div. 1946) (per curiam)
(similar).
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Both vignettes were organized similarly, with a short description of the
disputing parties, statutory text quoted, and party arguments back and forth.
Both vignettes include arguments about ordinary meaning based on dictiona-
ries, meaning within a larger textual context, and consistent use across statu-
tory texts in light of judicial precedent.  The vignettes in the control
condition were intended to moderately favor the defendants as a matter of
conventional legal analysis, although judge responses to the Election Law
case were difficult to predict.  That vignette was intended to implicate a more
ideologically charged field and was inspired by prior observational studies of
judge voting behavior.191
A randomly assigned treatment group received the same descriptions as
above, plus additional information and lexical ordering instructions.  In
Trade Name, the treatment group (n = 51) was given on-point legislative
history, while the control group (n = 50) was not.  The treatment group was
told that uncontradicted committee reports indicate that the statutory lan-
guage was intended to include safety testing.  The message from this source
clearly favored the plaintiff-company’s position, although judges were not
instructed on how much weight to give this source.  In Election Law, the
treatment group (n = 50) was given an administrative agency interpretation
that clearly favored the plaintiff-employees’ position, while the control group
(n = 51) was not.  The agency’s position included a short explanation of the
statute’s purported intent, with reference to employees having the same free-
dom to go to the polls as business owners.  The treatment group was told that
the courts in their jurisdiction have decided that judges should consider
committee reports and should defer to an agency’s position “if but only if the
other sources of statutory interpretation, taken together, leave the statute’s
meaning fairly or totally unclear as applied to the facts of the case.”192
All judges were asked about statutory clarity at the end of each vignette.
The control group was asked, for each vignette, “how clear is the statute as
applied to the facts of this case, on a scale of 1 to 5?”—with notations briefly
describing the scale (1 = totally unclear, 2 = fairly unclear, 3 = somewhat
clear, 4 = fairly clear, 5 = totally clear).193  These questions are doctrinally
extraneous in the absence of lexical ordering and lower-tier sources, but the
questions facilitate direct comparisons with the treatment group.  The treat-
ment group’s parallel questions reiterated the lexical ordering instructions
Respondents might have been aware of their home-state law on the subject.  This
awareness could influence those judges’ sense of statutory clarity in the vignette and the
correct judgment.  But it is unclear how such awareness would affect the influence of the
hypothetical lower-tier source presented to the treatment group.  One possibility is that
awareness of home-state law would tend to reduce the influence of sources in the vignettes,
because the answer became foreordained, thereby biasing the resulting treatment effect
downward.
191 See Samaha, Looking Over a Crowd, supra note 117, at 590, 610–13 (discussing the
plausibility and evidence of ideological influence in voting rights cases and in trademark
cases).
192 See infra Appendices A & B.
193 See infra Appendices A & B.
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by asking, “how clear is the statute as applied to the facts of this case, without
considering [the committee reports/the agency’s position], on a scale of 1 to
5?”194  The same descriptive notations were given.  All judges were then
asked for a final judgment in each case and for a level of confidence about
those judgments.
The survey instrument thus allowed judges to make decisions about stat-
utory clarity and, as a consequence, the legal relevance of lower-tier sources.
The clarity scale was described such that a response of three or above meant
that the judge was not supposed to consider the given lower-tier source.
Because the control group saw no lower-tier sources in their vignettes, we can
use their responses as a baseline for testing the effect, if any, of exposing
judges to such information.
2. Hypotheses
Following the lexical ordering instructions required the treatment group
to respond to the statutory clarity questions while ignoring lower-tier sources.
For one or more reasons, however, some respondents might be unable or
unwilling to mentally bracket those sources.195  Exactly how exposure to
lower-tier sources might influence clarity responses is difficult to predict, but
a significant difference at any point on our five-point scale would suggest a
problem for lexical ordering.  The primary and simplest hypothesis for a lexi-
cal ordering failure is that clarity responses will differ between treatment and
control groups (“Hypothesis 1—Clarity Effect”).
Following the lexical ordering instructions also required that final judg-
ments be stable, in part.  Judges who assigned clarity levels below three were
supposed to consider or follow the lower-tier source on final judgment, but
not judges who assigned clarity levels of three and above.  We can look for
evidence that exposure to a lower-tier source influenced certain combina-
tions of judgments and clarity levels, depending on the distribution of
responses in the control group.
One possibility is that lower-tier sources will improperly influence final
judgments without influencing clarity levels.  The lexical ordering instruc-
tions would be violated if a judge responded that a statute was at least some-
what clear regardless of exposure to lower-tier sources, but nonetheless
switched final judgments because of the exposure.  Thus another hypothesis
is that, among judges who assign clarity levels three and above, the fraction of
judges entering proplaintiff judgments will differ between treatment and
control groups (“Hypothesis 2—Judgment Flipping”).  This effect would be
especially strong, however, and we might have difficulty distinguishing such
judgment flipping from more complex failures of lexical ordering.196
194 See infra Appendices A & B.
195 See supra notes 153–57 (collecting explanations for failure to ignore information).
196 Exposure to lower-tier sources might have two simultaneous effects: (1) some judges
lower their clarity levels to below three and flip judgments from defendant to plaintiff; (2)
other judges stick with proplaintiff judgments but raise their clarity levels to three and
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In addition, we can begin to examine narrower theories for the conve-
nient use of clarity tests.197  Perhaps judges who are attracted to a lower-tier
source will make the source legally relevant by migrating to clarity levels
below three.  Judges who are instead repelled by a lower-tier source might
make the source legally irrelevant by migrating to clarity levels three and
above.  In our vignettes, some fraction of the control group will enter judg-
ment for the defendants, while the treatment group will see lower-tier
sources that support the plaintiffs.  We can look for evidence in support of
the hypotheses that the treatment group will move away from prodefendant
judgments at clarity levels three and above, and toward proplaintiff judg-
ments at clarity levels below three (“Hypothesis 3—Attraction”); and/or that
the treatment group will move away from prodefendant judgments at clarity
levels below three, and toward prodefendant judgments at clarity levels three
and above (“Hypothesis 4—Backlash”).
Identifying these convenient-use patterns might be difficult.  We lack
data on exactly how the judges feel about the lower-tier sources, aside from
their estimates of legislative history’s usefulness in general.  Furthermore, the
attraction and backlash theories are not mutually exclusive within a group of
judges.  These theories predict opposite effects on prodefendant judgments
at clarity levels three and above, and those effects could cancel out.  Fortu-
nately, the attraction theory predicts an increase in proplaintiff judgments at
clarity levels below three while the backlash theory does not.  However, such
an increase could come at the expense of prodefendant judgments at clarity
levels below three, which would not indicate a failure to lexically order.
Remember that judges who think that the statute is unclear are supposed to
consider the lower-tier sources, which support the plaintiffs.  In any event, we
should entertain plausible alternative explanations for apparent stability or
movement in judge responses.
As for differences between vignettes, reasonable debate is possible.  One
plausible prediction is that, in Trade Name, most judges will be able to follow
the instructions and ignore the committee reports in assessing clarity and in
making final judgments when they believe that the statute is otherwise ade-
quately clear.  Although specific and uncontradicted support for one side in
legislative history is a tempting source for some judges, the arguably low pol-
icy stakes might help legal professionals execute the instructions.  The most
plausible prediction for Election Law seems cloudier.  The ideological charge
of the issue area could reduce the influence of instructions and conventional
legal analysis; if so, we might see little difference when judges are exposed to
an agency position.  But judges who are sympathetic to the plaintiff’s position
as a matter of policy, constitutional principle, or otherwise might be tempted
above.  This combination might be confused with judgment flipping at clarity levels three
and above.  Also note that crosscutting judgment-flipping effects could cancel out, if some
judges are highly attracted to and other judges backlash away from lower-tier sources.
Indeed, all of the foregoing lexical ordering failures could occur without leaving clear
footprints in our data.
197 See supra Section II.C.
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to rely on agency support, thereby combining law’s sources with extralegal
moves.
3. Results
The results are provocatively mixed.  We see warning signs that some
judges departed from the lexical ordering instruction in the Election Law
case, but no equally consistent signs in the Trade Name case.  Table 2
presents summary statistics.198
TABLE 2:  SUMMARY STATISTICS
Control Treatment Difference
Trade Name, means
Clarity of the statute 3.14 3.35 0.21
(n = 49) (n = 51)
Judgment for defendant 0.88 0.71 -0.18
(n = 50) (n = 51)
Confidence in judgment 5.12 4.69 -0.43
(n = 50) (n = 46)
Election Law, means
Clarity of the statute 2.94 3.50 0.56
(n = 51) (n = 49)
Judgment for defendant 0.39 0.18 -0.21
(n = 49) (n = 49)
Confidence in judgment 4.83 5.18 0.34
(n = 51) (n = 48)
• Hypothesis 1—Clarity Effect
The first question is whether exposure to lower-tier sources influenced
judges’ clarity responses on our five-point scale.  A Mann-Whitney U test is
one way to compare distributions of discrete ordinal data.199  Using that test
198 We will generally report p-values to the third decimal place, and readers may draw
their own lines. See, e.g., ROBERT M. LAWLESS ET AL., EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW 233–34
(2010) (noting the p < 0.05 convention for statistical significance); Adam S. Chilton &
Marin K. Levy, Challenging the Randomness of Panel Assignment in the Federal Courts of Appeals,
101 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 36 (2015) (using p < 0.10); Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Aiming for
Evidence-Based Gun Policy, 25 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 691, 694 (2006) (contending that
the standard of significance for policy-relevant evidence should account for information
availability and expected costs and benefits).
199 See LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 198, at 271–73 (explaining that the test does not
depend on a normal distribution, does not rely on variables’ magnitudes, and is statistically
identical to the Wilcoxon rank-sum test); Farnsworth et al., supra note 17, at 267 (using the
Wilcoxon rank-sum test for a four-value scale of statutory ambiguity).
Using t-tests to compare means is controversial here because the data are not continu-
ous and normally distributed.  For readers willing to consider that comparison: in Trade
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-1\NDL103.txt unknown Seq: 48 19-NOV-18 13:00
202 notre dame law review [vol. 94:1
in Trade Name, the difference in clarity distributions for the treatment and
control groups is not statistically significant at conventional levels (p = 0.196).
The treatment judges might well have ignored the committee reports while
assessing statutory clarity in that case.  In Election Law, however, the differ-
ence in clarity distributions is highly significant (p = 0.004), indicating that
exposure to the agency’s position influenced some of the treatment judges.
We also conducted a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, which evaluates the differ-
ence in the largest gap between points on two distributions.200  Under that
test the result is more equivocal for Trade Name, although the difference
between treatment and control does fall short of the 95% threshold (p =
0.090).  The result for Election Law remains unequivocal, however.  The dif-
ference in clarity distributions is again highly significant (p = 0.005).
We explored the robustness of these results by adding control variables.
Tables 3 and 4 report estimates from ordered probit models, and the head-
lines are broadly similar.201  Table 3 shows that we cannot confirm a treat-
ment effect in any of our models for Trade Name.  Model 1 has one
independent variable for whether the judge was in the treatment group.
Model 2 adds a variable for the judge’s view on the usefulness of legislative
history: the Trade Name treatment group was exposed to one form of legisla-
tive history, and perhaps a judge’s general view on its usefulness will indicate
a propensity to find these statutory texts unclear.  Model 3 adds an interac-
tion term to check whether any treatment effects are conditional on judges’
general views about the usefulness of legislative history.202  Model 4 adds a
variable representing the judge’s general view on the vagueness of statutory
text.  Model 5 adds controls for whether the judge was part of the Midwest
state group, a federal judge, or a military judge.  Neither treatment nor any
other independent variable is significant in any of these models.203
Name the difference between the control and treatment means (3.14 versus 3.35) is not
significant (p = 0.269), while in Election Law the difference (2.94 versus 3.50) is significant
(p = 0.006).  This is largely consistent with our other results.
200 See GREGORY W. CORDER & DALE I. FOREMAN, NONPARAMETRIC STATISTICS 80 (2d ed.
2014).
201 See generally LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 198, at 345, 349–50 (discussing ordered
probit models).  Our randomized trial already provides some comfort in drawing causal
inferences.
202 When interpreting interaction effects in nonlinear models such as ordered probit, it
is insufficient to assess the sign and p-value on the coefficient for the interaction term.
More thorough interpretation requires an assessment of the sign and p-value for each pos-
sible combination of values of the interaction term. See Chunrong Ai & Edward C. Norton,
Interaction Terms in Logit and Probit Models, 80 ECON. LETTERS 123 (2003).  Doing so for
Models 3–5 in Trade Name indicates that the signs and p-values for each value of the
interaction term are all negative and not statistically significant at even the 90% level.
203 In two models not displayed in Table 3, we instead used an interaction term with a
dummy variable for whether the judge’s view on legislative history’s usefulness was espe-
cially high on the seven-point scale (i.e., Treatment * LH useful > 5), or especially low (i.e.,
Treatment * LH useful < 3).  None of the independent variables reached statistical signifi-
cance at the 90% level in Trade Name.  We also ran a simpler model with no interaction
term but with Treatment, LH useful, and Text vague; then a model with those variables
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Table 4 shows estimates for Election Law.  The results are somewhat
mixed using the models above: The treatment variable is highly significant in
Models 1 and 2 (p < 0.01) but falls short of the 95% level in Models 3, 4, and
5 (p < 0.10).  However, those last three models include the interaction term,
which involves legislative history’s usefulness.  Election Law’s treatment
group was exposed to an agency position, not legislative history, and thus we
lose any straightforward reason to include a variable that represents judicial
views on legislative history.204  In Model 6, we drop the variables involving
legislative history and include treatment and the textual vagueness variable.
In Model 7, we add back the controls for judge type.  In these last two models
for Election Law, the treatment variable is, once more, highly significant (p <
0.01).205  For the sake of symmetry, we ran Models 6 and 7 for Trade Name
and, like the other models for Trade Name, the treatment variable is not
statistically significant.
Finally, we conducted a binomial logit regression for which we converted
the five-point clarity scale into a binary variable: low (1 or 2) or high (3, 4, or
5).  This split tracks the legal line between unclear and clear statutes that was
drawn by the lexical ordering instructions.  In Trade Name, the treatment
variable is again not significant (p = 0.875).  In Election Law, this time the
treatment variable is only marginally significant (p = 0.096).  This muted
result reflects that the differences between the treatment and control groups’
clarity responses are mostly at clarity levels three and above, rather than
across the legal line between clear and unclear statutes.  The distributions of
clarity responses are displayed in Figures 2 and 3.  Figures 4 and 5 display
histograms that combine judges’ clarity responses with their corresponding
final judgments, which are relevant to our other hypotheses.
plus the controls for Midwest group, federal judge, and military judge; then two models
with all of the foregoing variables but swapping out LH useful for either the dummy varia-
ble, LH useful > 5, or instead, LH useful < 3.  Again, none of the independent variables
reached statistical significance in these models for Trade Name.
204 We lack data on whether judges’ general views about the usefulness of legislative
history track their general views about the persuasiveness of agency interpretations.
205 Additionally, when any of the models discussed in note 203 above are run for Elec-
tion Law, the treatment variable is significant at p < 0.01 or p < 0.05.
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TABLE 3:  TRADE NAME—ORDERED PROBIT MODELS OF CLARITY RESPONSES
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Treatment 0.223 0.258 0.663 0.670 0.686 0.281 0.335
(0.215) (0.227) (0.572) (0.575) (0.578) (0.225) (0.230)
LH useful -0.0119 0.0382 0.0378 0.0385
(0.0662) (0.0927) (0.0928) (0.0932)
Treatment * LH useful -0.102 -0.104 -0.0944
(0.132) (0.133) (0.134)
Text vague 0.0137 0.0502 -0.00218 0.0370
(0.110) (0.116) (0.108) (0.114)
Midwest group 0.459 0.442
(0.326) (0.324)
Federal judge 0.353 0.345
(0.425) (0.424)
Military judge -0.196 -0.243
(0.387) (0.384)
Observations 101 95 95 95 95 96 96
TABLE 4:  ELECTION LAW—ORDERED PROBIT MODELS OF CLARITY RESPONSES
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Treatment 0.579*** 0.586*** 1.022* 0.999* 0.992* 0.597*** 0.652***
(0.217) (0.227) (0.567) (0.571) (0.574) (0.223) (0.229)
LH useful -0.0510 0.00111 0.000404 0.00201
(0.0645) (0.0894) (0.0895) (0.0899)
Treatment * LH useful -0.109 -0.103 -0.0872
(0.129) (0.130) (0.131)
Text vague -0.0344 0.0102 -0.0477 0.00379
(0.108) (0.113) (0.106) (0.112)
Midwest group 0.163 0.188
(0.319) (0.318)
Federal judge -0.0960 -0.104
(0.412) (0.410)
Military judge -0.577 -0.603
(0.380) (0.377)
Observations 101 96 96 96 96 97 97
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.  Standard errors in parentheses.  The dependent variable is the
judge’s assessment of statutory clarity on a five-point scale.  The Trade Name treatment group was
exposed to legislative history; the Election Law treatment group was exposed to an agency position.
“LH useful” and “Text vague” are the judge’s responses to general questions about the usefulness of
legislative history and the vagueness of statutory text, respectively, measured on seven-point scales of
frequency.  On the interaction term, see supra note 202.
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FIGURE 2: Trade Name—Distribution of clarity responses
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FIGURE 3: Election Law—Distribution of clarity responses
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FIGURE 4: Trade Name—Distribution of clarity-plus-judgment responses
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FIGURE 5:  Election Law—Distribution of clarity-plus-judgment responses
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• Hypothesis 2—Judgment Flipping
To test our hypothesis regarding judgment flipping at high-clarity levels,
we isolated the judges who assigned clarity levels of three and above, which
were sufficiently high to rule out the lawful consideration of lower-tier
sources.  In Trade Name, this left seventy-two judges (thirty-six in control,
thirty-six in treatment); in Election Law, this left seventy judges (thirty-one in
control, thirty-nine in treatment).  We then compared the percentage of
these judges who entered judgment for the defendant in the treatment as
opposed to the control group.  Finding a significant difference on this mea-
sure would intimate a rather serious lexical ordering failure, in which final
judgments are flipped by exposure to a lower-tier source despite consistently
high reported levels of statutory clarity in the other sources.  This effect
would be something like jumping from one end of the histogram to the
other.
The Trade Name results do not indicate such judgment flipping.  The
gap in the percentage of judges who entered judgment for the defendant at
clarity levels three and above in the control group (92%) and the treatment
group (86%) is not significant (p = 0.460).  This result is hard to explain on
the theory that such excerpts from committee reports are not persuasive
enough to influence judgments.  Among the relatively few judges who
assigned clarity levels below three, the difference in prodefendant judgments
in control (79%) and treatment (33%) is significant (p = 0.013).
The Election Law numbers are more suggestive of judgment flipping,
with our test result hovering around conventional significance thresholds.
The difference between prodefendant judgments at clarity levels three and
above in control (35%) and treatment (15%) approaches the 95% level in a
two-sided test (p = 0.052).206  This is true even though the control group in
Election Law already tilted toward the plaintiffs, which put a ceiling on the
attractive effect of the proplaintiff agency position.  We have reason to sus-
pect that the agency position moved some judges to the plaintiffs’ side
despite the lexical ordering instructions, perhaps by flipping judgments at
relatively high clarity levels.  Other, more subtle lexical ordering failures are
possible as well.207
206 Two judges’ responses to the final judgment question for the Election Law vignette
were difficult to interpret and were excluded from our tests for Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4.
One of these two surveys was implicated in the Election Law test for Hypothesis 2 and thus
excluded.  If instead this response is coded as proplaintiff, the significance of the differ-
ence decreases (p = 0.064); if instead this response is coded as prodefendant, the signifi-
cance increases (p = 0.033).  All three results are near the 95% level.
207 For reasons noted above, see supra note 196, our test for Hypothesis 2 cannot readily
distinguish between judgment flipping without changes in clarity responses and more com-
plex movements along a continuum.  Those more complex movements represent a differ-
ent type of lexical ordering failure, not a success.  In Election Law, the percentage of
judges assigning clarity levels of three and above was not obviously the same in control
(63%) and treatment (78%)—which is a reason to suspect that more than judgment flip-
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• Hypothesis 3—Attraction
As for convenient use of clarity tests, we find little evidence for the spe-
cific versions of this idea in our hypotheses.  According to the attraction the-
ory, judges who would otherwise enter prodefendant judgments at clarity
levels three and above will switch to the plaintiff side and make the lower-tier
source legally relevant by moving to clarity levels below three.  But we cannot
confirm this pattern in our results.  In Trade Name, the fraction of judges
entering prodefendant judgments at clarity levels three and above did not
drop significantly in the treatment group (p = 0.271, one-sided t-test), even
though the fraction of proplaintiff judgments at clarity levels below three did
rise (p = 0.019, one-sided t-test).208  For that latter effect, we cannot rule out
a perfectly lawful explanation: The rise in proplaintiff judgments at low clar-
ity levels could have come from treatment judges who otherwise would have
entered prodefendant judgments at equally low clarity levels.  As long as their
clarity assessments were not affected, judges were supposed to consider the
proplaintiff committee reports at low clarity levels.
Nor can we confirm this attraction theory in Election Law.  Although the
fraction of prodefendant judgments at clarity levels three and above might be
lower in the treatment group (p = 0.079, one-sided t-test), the fraction of
proplaintiff judgments at clarity levels below three is not higher (p = 0.728,
one-sided t-test).  Perhaps exposure to the agency position had more than
one effect and this attraction theory captures one of them, but we cannot be
sure.209  Either way, and by the way, there is no lawful explanation for any
real decrease in prodefendant judgments at relatively high clarity levels.  The
instructions required judges at those clarity levels to lock in their clarity
responses and final judgments against influence from lower-tier sources.
• Hypothesis 4—Backlash
According to the backlash theory, when exposed to the proplaintiff
lower-tier sources, judges who would otherwise enter prodefendant judg-
ments at clarity levels below three will stick with the defendant and make the
source legally irrelevant by moving to clarity levels three and above.  But we
cannot confirm this pattern, either.  In Trade Name, there might be a drop
in prodefendant judgments at clarity levels below three in the treatment
group (p = 0.052, one-sided t-test), but there is no accompanying increase in
ping occurred.  In Trade Name, that percentage was very similar in control (72%) and
treatment (71%).
208 One-sided tests are appropriate here because the hypothesis predicts the direction
(i.e., the sign) of the two treatment effects.
209 For example, (1) some judges in the treatment group could be responding to the
agency’s position by moving from prodefendant judgments at clarity level three to
proplaintiff judgments at clarity level two, while (2) other judges in the treatment group
could be responding by moving from proplaintiff judgments at clarity level two to proplain-
tiff judgments at clarity level three or four.  The combined effects on proplaintiff judg-
ments at clarity level two could cancel out such that no change is noticeable in that slot on
our histogram.
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prodefendant judgments at clarity levels three and above (p = 0.729, one-
sided t-test).  In Election Law, the upshot is the same.  Even if prodefendant
judgments at low clarity levels are significantly lower in the treatment group
(p = 0.048, one-sided t-test), there is again no accompanying increase in
prodefendant judgments at clarity levels and above (p = 0.921, one-sided t-
test).
• Other Possibilities
Several of our hypotheses focused on the legally critical line for statutory
clarity.  But, in retrospect, Figures 2–5 suggest other effects that do not
depend on judges crossing that line.  We can pause to think about possible
effects that were not predicted by our initial hypotheses and that might war-
rant future study.  The most striking possibility is that some judges reacted to
the lower-tier sources by elevating their clarity assessments, to create an extra
cushion against the legal line for relying on those sources.
The raw clarity distributions suggest that treatment group judges moved
toward clarity level four—not toward law’s borderline between clear and
unclear statutes.  But these apparent spikes favored different sides in the two
different cases.  Having seen the proplaintiff committee reports in Trade
Name, some treatment judges might have backed away from the implication
of that lower-tier source and entered prodefendant judgments at clarity level
four.  In contrast, having seen the proplaintiff agency position in Election
Law, some treatment judges might have leaned toward the implication of
that lower-tier source and entered proplaintiff judgments at clarity level four.
We cannot be sure where these possible movements would have come
from.  But few control group judges assigned clarity level five in either case,
so the bulk of any movement would have come from lower clarity levels.  The
largest percentage drop from control to treatment for any clarity-plus-judg-
ment combination is the same in both cases: prodefendant judgments at clar-
ity level three.  So, in Trade Name, some treatment judges might have moved
from borderline clarity to higher clarity levels while sticking with the defen-
dant; in Election Law, some judges might have likewise elevated their clarity
assessments but switched to the plaintiffs’ side.
D. Implications
1. Patterns and Limitations
Our survey indicated that successful lexical ordering would exact sacri-
fices.  Many of the surveyed judges had general views about statutory vague-
ness and legislative history’s usefulness such that a clarity test for access to
lower-tier sources would generate unwelcome results.
Our experiment then showed mixed judicial success at lexical ordering.
The Trade Name results are a success story, largely.  Perhaps some judges
failed to ignore the committee reports when required by the instructions but
such failures are not statistically apparent.  Moreover, the judges’ general
views about statutory vagueness and legislative history did not help predict
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clarity responses in our models, which is consistent with judges concentrating
on the instructions and the top-tier sources at hand.  The Election Law
results, in contrast, include stronger warnings of failure.  The agency position
seems to have influenced some judges’ clarity assessments, and perhaps their
final judgments, when only top-tier sources should have been considered.
Our experiment cannot fully explain these patterns.  But, even at this
stage, we can suggest possible predictors of failure.  Other commentators
have maintained that (1) the case’s perceived importance and ideological
charge can influence whether judges depart from plain meaning;210 and (2)
the source’s credibility and emotional charge can influence whether judges
consider the information.211
On case features, our results arguably are consistent with instructions
weakening as case importance and ideological charge rise.  The Election Law
vignette was drafted to be more ideologically charged and less routine than
Trade Name.212  We cannot be sure from the data, but it would not be sur-
prising if judges care more about a voting-rights dispute between employees
and employer than a product-naming dispute between two unknown compa-
nies.  Note that this is not a purely attitudinal account.  The weakening of
lexical ordering instructions would depend partly on exposure to an addi-
tional source of law.
On source features, our experiment can only foreground possibilities.
First, agency positions might be more attractive than legislative history, at
least in the form of smoking-gun snippets in committee reports that are not
integrated with a deeper argument about the statute.213  Judges might be less
likely to ignore the decisiveness and possibly the expertise in agency posi-
tions—even if judges are committed to agency-deference doctrines as a mat-
ter of binding law.214  If so, the lexical ordering element of Chevron doctrine
would be especially vulnerable.215  Second, judges might have been attracted
210 See Schauer, supra note 99, at 247–49 (suggesting that justices might use plain
meaning readings as a strong factor in decisionmaking when the case is somehow not
interesting or less politically charged); cf. Ryan D. Doerfler, High-Stakes Interpretation, 116
MICH. L. REV. 523, 530 (2018) (contending that courts tend to resist finding statutory clar-
ity when the case “matters specially”).
211 See Wistrich et al., supra note 152, at 1275–76.
212 See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
213 I thank William Eskridge for raising a question along these lines.
214 In Gluck and Posner’s illuminating interviews with a mostly nonrandom sample of
federal circuit judges, several respondents doubted that the Supreme Court had authority
to bind them to broad interpretive rules. See Gluck & Posner, supra note 16, at 1306–07.
But some of those decentralist judges made exceptions for certain canons such as lenity,
and “every interviewed judge told us [the Chevron doctrine] is binding even if they dis-
agreed with it.” Id. at 1345 (emphasis omitted).  It seems that about half of the respon-
dents indicated that they consider legislative history (only?) if statutory text is unclear, see
id. at 1316, but the reported results do not have a count of judges who support or accept
such lexical ordering.
215 To the extent that Chevron imposed lexical ordering but did not change the likeli-
hood of judicial deference, one explanation is that judges often cannot ignore the agency’s
position at Step One (or elsewhere).  If so, converting Chevron to a supermajority voting
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to the agency’s proplaintiff position rather than the agency’s status.  Perhaps
more judges were on the verge of adopting the plaintiff’s position at baseline,
and thus exposure to a proplaintiff lower-tier source became too attractive to
ignore.216  Third, other source content might matter.  The agency position
in Election Law included a short policy rationale while the committee reports
in Trade Name did not.  Perhaps the same Election Law message from a
litigating party would have similar influence.217  Our experiment was
designed to implicate these potential influences without disentangling them.
With adequate numbers of judge participants, we can learn more
through additional experimental variation.  Varying the lower-tier source
type, direction, and other content, as well as the importance and ideological
charge of the cases, would help identify any influence of these factors.  Our
vignettes’ order of presentation was fixed and, likewise, it could be varied to
examine order effects.  Furthermore, we imposed a modest cognitive load.
The vignettes were short and judges were not asked to write opinions or
deliberate in groups.  This design is convenient and follows several previous
studies,218 plus most judges face resource constraints that make rapid judg-
ments realistic.219  Even so, the effects of docket load, case complexity, and
time pressure are independently important topics.220
Beyond standard external validity concerns, our experiment relied on
relatively less experienced judges.221  Experience might matter.  If, for
instance, greater judicial experience increases a person’s proficiency at lexi-
cal ordering, then we have another reason to confront the hard trade-offs in
Part II.  Moreover, our participants were appellate rather than trial judges,
mostly state rather than federal judges, and, for the sake of anonymity and
response rates, they were not asked demographic, policy, or political affilia-
tion questions.  We know little about the participants’ general views on statu-
tory interpretation.  A different mix of judges and additional data on each
judge could yield further lessons.
rule that asks judges for “the best interpretation of the statute,” Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian
Vermeule, Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116 YALE L.J. 676, 679 (2007), would likely not pro-
duce very different judicial outcomes compared to a pre-Chevron multifactor test.
216 Our control group was far more likely to be persuaded by the plaintiffs’ position in
Election Law than in Trade Name.
217 Also, to reflect contemporary doctrine, the instructions stated that judges “should
consider” the committee reports if the statute was otherwise relatively unclear, but that
judges “should defer” to the agency interpretation. See infra Appendices A & B.  Perhaps
these formulations differently influence judges’ likelihood of ignoring lower-tier sources
while working with top-tier sources—although that influence is not obvious theoretically.
218 See supra Section III.A (describing experiments by the Guthrie group, the Kahan
group, and others).
219 See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogeneity: How to Read a Statute in a
Lower Court, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 433, 470–72 (2012) (distinguishing most courts from the
U.S. Supreme Court).
220 Cf. Spamann & Klo¨hn, supra note 170, at 268–73 (finding, in a labor-intensive deci-
sion setting, that judges were unable to ignore simple extralegal case facts in deciding an
international criminal dispute).
221 See supra notes 187–88 and accompanying text.
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2. Failure’s Types and Success’s Burdens
In any event, we can be sure that lexical ordering fails in more than one
way, and that not every failure is equally important.  Beyond effects on clarity
assessments, which we saw in Election Law, our experiment focused on seri-
ous failures involving final judgments.  Our tests did not confirm that judges
conveniently used the clarity test to make attractive sources legally relevant
and unattractive sources legally irrelevant.  Those possibilities deserve ongo-
ing investigation but they are not obvious in our results.  On the other hand,
some judges in Election Law might well have flipped judgments at relatively
high clarity levels.  This would be an acute form of failure in which a lower-
tier source pushes some judges from near one end of the clarity-plus-judg-
ment spectrum toward the other.
Tainted clarity assessments are less dramatic failures, but they can be
troubling.  Consider the possibility of judges building “clarity cushions,”222
which avoid recognition of close calls that tax judges cognitively or in exposi-
tion.  This could happen when judges find a lower-tier source controversial,
discordant, or otherwise problematic.  Think about the committee reports in
Trade Name.  Not only would some judges find this category of source sus-
pect, but many would view the reports as conflicting with top-tier sources.223
Perhaps some treatment judges stuck with the defendant and elevated their
clarity assessments even higher, to make the proplaintiff committee reports
more plainly irrelevant as a matter of law.
Clarity cushions might appear when final judgments flip, too.  In Elec-
tion Law, judges seemed inclined toward the agency position, and a high
clarity assessment would ensure the legal irrelevance of that source.  That
seems inconvenient.  But some judges who perceived a modest degree of clar-
ity for the defendant in the top-tier sources might have been encouraged to
take the plaintiff’s side after seeing the agency’s position, without relying on
it explicitly.224  As their judgments flipped, an elevated clarity assessment
would position these judges to maintain that the statute already plainly sup-
ported the plaintiffs, and that the agency’s position either need not be
addressed,225 or provides an alternative ground for judgment.226  Certitude
is a convention for some judges.227
222 See supra subsection III.C.3. (“Other Possibilities”).
223 In Trade Name, confidence among the treatment judges seems lower than the con-
trol judges. See supra Table 2.
224 In Election Law, confidence among the treatment judges seems higher than the con-
trol judges. See supra Table 2.
225 Cf. Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc., 566 U.S. 93, 100, 113 n.12 (2012) (finding that a
statute clearly favored the agency’s position, and thus not addressing whether such posi-
tion was eligible for Chevron deference).
226 Cf. Bimini Superfast Operations LLC v. Winkowski, 994 F. Supp. 2d 106, 125
(D.D.C. 2014) (indicating that the court would defer to the agency’s position even if the
statute were unclear).
227 Cf. Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision
Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 513 (2004) (discussing coherence-based reasoning that
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Thus several types of failure can be linked to plausible theory, suggestive
evidence, or both.  Lower-tier sources might improperly affect clarity assess-
ments, final judgments, or both.  When judgments are improperly affected,
the failure is serious and covert, and it might or might not equate with an
aboveboard all-inclusive approach to sources.228  When judgments are not
affected, the failure is less serious but no less covert, and the lexical ordering
effort might be wasteful to judges and probably will be misleading to observ-
ers.  For example, when clarity assessments remain high yet affected by con-
troversial lower-tier sources, judges avoid overtly grappling with those sources
and likely will misstate the difficulty of the decision.  Whether or not the
parties mind, those opinions might be cited and used as models of interpre-
tive reasoning going forward.  The probabilities for each failure type remain
to be seen.
None of this should obscure the signs of judicial success in our results.
Many of our tests did not show judges manipulating clarity tests or shifting
judgments in defiance of their instructions.  At the same time, we should
know that the hard trade-offs in Part II arise precisely when judges succeed at
lexical ordering.  “Success” means that decision quality and decision costs
tend to fall in a mediocre range compared to prominent alternative meth-
ods, even as decisiveness is maximized.  This compromise should not be
accepted without careful reflection.  While not every lexical ordering failure
is important to the legal system, any success is reason to wonder whether
lexical ordering is worthwhile.
3. Toward Reform
We can close by recognizing some motivations and options for reform
today.  Additional research is appropriate before reaching definitive conclu-
sions, but waiting is not entirely possible for judges.  The live methodological
choices will not disappear as we build knowledge, and lexical ordering’s
nationwide spread increases the urgency of reconsideration.
At minimum, nobody should casually assume that a judiciary’s lexical
ordering efforts will succeed or fail.  Proponents are not entitled to believe
that courts have reached a compromise with predictable effects across the
statutory docket, and critics are not entitled to disregard lexical ordering
avowals as so much ineffectual formalism.  Success will be mixed.  And suc-
cess might well be most likely in the heartland of lower court dockets, where
most judges professionally process tall stacks of apparently ordinary cases.
yields confident conclusions and its limits); Brad Snyder, The Judicial Genealogy (and Mythol-
ogy) of John Roberts: Clerkships from Gray to Brandeis to Friendly to Roberts, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1149,
1188 n.235 (2010) (noting a quip, attributed to Justice Brandeis, “that the difficulty with
this place is that if you’re only fifty-five percent convinced of a proposition, you have to act
and vote as if you were one hundred percent convinced”).
228 Although possible, we cannot yet demonstrate that failed lexical ordering equals an
all-inclusive approach.  Our experiment compared Caminetti-style lexical ordering efforts
with flat exclusion of sources, not an American Trucking–style inclusive approach.
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Those cases add up, along with the complications and downsides of lexical
ordering efforts.
When it succeeds, lexical ordering imposes an odd mix of consequences:
middling decision quality, middling decision costs, and superior judicial deci-
siveness.  That combination lacks a straightforward justification on interpre-
tive principle,229 and it is obviously debatable in pragmatic terms.230  Surely
it supplies no firm ground for a nationwide hammerlock on interpretive
method when sources of any substantial value are involved.  Even complete
judicial success at ignoring lower-tier sources when instructed leaves other
hard jobs unfinished, including the development of an acceptable clarity test,
the assignment of sources to tiers, and the weighting of sources within tiers.
When flushed out, lexical ordering is a complex methodological option with
controversial effects and no easy claim to superiority.
Concentrating on the value of public relations or compromise does little
to improve the claim.231  It is hardly obvious that existing “clarity” tests can
build much confidence in the rule of law or anything else.232  To the extent
that observers do not understand the trade-offs, any resulting confidence
probably is unearned.  Success will be mixed, anyway, and so nobody should
be uniformly impressed by the instruction.  Indeed, the mixture of success
and failure could specially threaten confidence levels.  If instructions truly
are weakest in cases that are ideologically charged or high stakes, then
observers are most likely to witness or suspect methodological departures in
the highest profile cases.  And for judges seeking compromise and guidance,
lexical ordering would then achieve the least influence in the cases that prob-
ably need it most.
If nothing else, courts and others probably should renew an attitude of
respect for judges who want to organize their thinking differently from the
orthodox compromise that lexical ordering represents at the moment.
Whether proexclusion or proinclusion, simpler and more extreme method-
ological alternatives for statutory cases might justifiably gain ground, or just
tolerance, once the trade-offs and implementation challenges for lexical
ordering are better understood.  In this regard, methodology would be a rel-
atively decentralized judge-by-judge choice.  Somewhat similarly, we could
renew respect for today’s outlier jurisdictions that do not attempt to position
legislative history or agency positions in lexically inferior tiers.  Past efforts to
restate and spread a mainstream view on statutory interpretation have had
limited influence at the state level.233  Understanding the hard choices and
uncertainties that surround lexical ordering provides reason to appreciate
229 See supra Section II.A.
230 See supra Section II.B.
231 See supra Section II.C.
232 See supra text accompanying note 89.  In our survey and experiment, judges were
not all over the map in their estimations of statutory clarity, but there was noticeable varia-
tion in Figures 1–3.
233 See supra note 59 (discussing the American Bar Association’s uniform state laws
efforts).
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interjurisdictional diversity.  Not every state should be asked to adopt plain
meaning rules.  The alternatives remain all too plausible.
For unshaken supporters of centralized guidance, a more ambitious
response is to shore up the lexical ordering instructions by restructuring the
judicial decision environment—which, as far as we know, has never hap-
pened.  Probably unsurprisingly.  To ensure that lower-tier sources do not
improperly influence judges, other staff could be assigned the task of with-
holding that information unless and until judges conclude that the statute is
otherwise unclear.  True ignorance of a source guarantees its powerlessness.
But even setting aside the special problem of keeping judges in the dark
about agency positions, reengineering the decision process would require
more than extra time and faithful staff within chambers.  For appellate
courts, it would require coordination across chambers so that no judge on a
shared panel is prematurely exposed to lower-tier sources by the other
judges.  Not only the briefing and bench memorandum process would need
restructuring, but also the mechanics of oral argument, deliberation, and
opinion writing.  Without such architectural safeguards, judges might be left
to train and concentrate as well as they can, with limited prospects for suc-
cess.  The truly effective fixes are costly and perhaps unrealistic today.  For
those who already are unsettled by lexical ordering’s trade-offs, the prospect
of additional effort to implement the instructions should turn their attention
to other options.234
A more resigned yet thoughtful response is to abandon lexical ordering
efforts in statutory interpretation—which certainly has happened before.  As
many New Deal and post–New Deal judges became interested in additional
information for deciding statutory cases and dissatisfied with plain meaning
barriers thereto, they cast aside what they thought was an artificial hindrance
to thoughtful judgments.  They confirmed legislative history and agency posi-
tions as potentially important factors in their decisions, among other consid-
erations.  And as some Reagan-era and post-Reagan judges became wary of
the amount and quality of sources such as floor statements and committee
reports, they cast aside what they thought was distracting and inconclusive
information for understanding statutes.  Both positions are extreme in a
sense, but they also share the simplifying feature of inquiry freed from a clar-
ity test, however elaborated.  Neither is a good candidate for judiciary-wide
compromise in most jurisdictions at this date, and both have their own draw-
234 This is not to conclude that convenient case-closing tiebreakers are unjustifiable.  It
is to suggest that attempting to assign lexical inferiority to a source category with any signif-
icant net value is problematic.  However, our findings do begin to raise questions about
part of the theory for choosing tiebreakers.  Demoting agency interpretations is theoreti-
cally good for judicial decisiveness, generally speaking, while demoting legislative history is
theoretically good for lowering decision costs. See supra text accompanying note 135.  If
agency positions often cannot be ignored, then their tiebreaking function is threatened,
assuming no double counting. See supra note 136.  But again, our experiment cannot con-
firm that different source categories have different effects on judges’ ability to lexically
order successfully.  That question is open for future research.
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backs measured in decisiveness and more.  But those options do not labor
under the complications imposed by the curious logic of lexical ordering.235
CONCLUSION
Today the defense of lexically ordered statutory interpretation is not
much better than familiarity plus optimism.  Its logical structure is popular in
form but sometimes fragile in practice, and challenging to justify in any
event.  Under certain conditions, interpreters surely can carry out these
instructions; under other conditions, the instructions will fail or make no
difference.  When the instructions are followed, the trade-offs often are
troubling.  Judges may avoid those particular trade-offs either by truncating
the analysis, if the information can be flatly excluded, or instead by integrat-
ing all relevant information into the mix.  Although we still have much to
learn about lexically ordered interpretation, its current popularity far
exceeds our ability to confidently justify its continuation.  Indeed, the spread
of lexical ordering in statutory cases should generate powerful demands for
more knowledge about its real-world operation, along with respect for judges
and judiciaries who would depart from today’s orthodox ordering—the core
problems of which are, by now, almost clear.
235 Judges who want to flatly exclude sources need a decision architecture that will help
them ignore sources.  If some appellate judges on the same court hold to more inclusive
approaches, then proexclusion judges face a design problem partly shared with lexical
ordering proponents.  Proinclusion judges face a different problem: ensuring that all
sources are considered thoughtfully, especially when the workload feels heavy.
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APPENDIX A
Case #1: Trade Name
You are a judge assigned to decide the following case:
Company X is developing a drug that it calls Nova, and it has shipped the drug with
the Nova label to several laboratories to test the drug’s safety.  Company Y recently
began selling a different drug that it, too, calls Nova.
A statute prohibits, as an unfair trade practice, the use of “a product name that
already has been used in commerce openly by another person or company.”
Company X asserts that its drug has been “used in commerce” according to the ordi-
nary meaning of those words.  The company quotes dictionaries to show that the word
“commerce” may be used to mean “activities that relate to the buying and selling of
goods and services.”  The company emphasizes that its drug already has been shipped
for safety tests, although the company admits that the drug has not been bought or
sold.
Company Y asserts that Company X’s drug has not yet been “used in commerce.”
Company Y points out that the dictionary definition quoted above is a secondary defi-
nition.  The first dictionary definition of “commerce” is “the buying and selling of
commodities.”  The company contends that the word “openly” in the statute provides
context for concluding that this statute follows the primary definition of “commerce,”
and does not protect products shipped for safety testing before hitting the market.  In
other sections of the same statute regulating unfair trade practices, “used in com-
merce” has been interpreted by courts to mean the actual buying and selling of com-
modities — and not activity merely related thereto.
[CONTROL: How clear is the statute as applied to the facts of this case, on a scale of 1 to
5?]
[TREATMENT: Company X replies by stressing the committee reports produced in the
legislature.  Those reports describe “used in commerce openly” as “intended to
include commercial sales along with less traditional product uses such as distribution
for test marketing and safety testing.”  No other legislative history contradicts these
reports.  The courts in your jurisdiction have decided that judges should consider
committee reports if but only if the other sources of statutory interpretation, taken
together, leave the statute’s meaning fairly or totally unclear as applied to the facts of
the case.
How clear is the statute as applied to the facts of this case, without considering the
committee reports, on a scale of 1 to 5?]
1 = Totally unclear
2 = Fairly unclear
3 = Somewhat clear
4 = Fairly clear
5 = Totally clear
For whom would you enter judgment: Company X or Company Y? . . . .
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APPENDIX B
Case #2: Election Law
You are a judge assigned to decide the following case:
Twenty employees earn hourly wages at a manufacturing plant.  They took time off
from work to vote in the last election.  Their employer did not pay them for the hours
that they were away from work.
A statute declares that “employers shall allow each employee the time needed to vote
during the workday, without penalizing them with a reduction in wages.”
The employees assert that they suffered a “reduction in wages” according to the ordi-
nary meaning of those words.  The employees quote dictionaries indicating that
“reduction” may be used to mean “making a specified thing smaller or less.”  The
employees claim that their wages were made less by their employer because they left
work to vote.
The employer agrees that the quoted dictionary definition is an ordinary meaning of
“reduction,” but asserts that the “specified thing” that must not be reduced is wages
paid for work actually done.  The employer contends that the word “penalizing” in
the statute helps show the context in which “reduction” was used, and that not being
paid while absent from work is not really a penalty.  The employer also points to
statutes addressing jury duty and medical appointments. In those statutes, prohibi-
tions on “a reduction in wages” have been interpreted by courts to mean a reduction
in wages paid for work actually done.
[CONTROL: How clear is the statute as applied to the facts of this case, on a scale of 1 to
5?]
[TREATMENT: The employees reply by emphasizing the position of the agency charged
with administering the relevant statute.  The agency has concluded that the statute “is
intended to allow employees the freedom to go to the polls without losing any money
that they could have earned at work, just as business owners who lack day-to-day job
duties are usually free to go to the polls without financial loss.”  The courts in your
jurisdiction have decided that judges should defer to an agency’s position on the
meaning of a statute if but only if the other sources of statutory interpretation, taken
together, leave the statute’s meaning fairly or totally unclear as applied to the facts of
the case.
How clear is the statute as applied to the facts of this case, without considering the
agency’s position, on a scale of 1 to 5?]
1 = Totally unclear
2 = Fairly unclear
3 = Somewhat clear
4 = Fairly clear
5 = Totally clear
For whom would you enter judgment: the employees or the employer? . . . .
